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Problem Description
De-identification of Electronic Health Records
To facilitate medical research and sharing of medical health information from Electronic
Health Records (EHRs), the content must be anonymized, de-identified or pseudono-
mized in order to preserve patient confidentiality. Information is considered sensitive if
it can be used to identify an individual, thus such information is privacy protected and
encompassed by a number of statutes. Accordingly, such information must either be re-
moved or replaced. Sensitive information includes information about persons (patients,
health care providers, relatives), places (city names, street names) and institutions/a-
gencies (medical clinics, hospitals, workplaces). De-identification performed manually
on large sets of EHRs is time-consuming, prohibitively expensive and error-prone [1];
consequently, methods for automatic or semi-automatic de-identification is of scientific,
health and commercial interest.
The task is to implement a java based application that de-identifies free text clinical
notes, with the purpose of recognizing sensitive information. This is an experimen-
tal approach in which different methods and techniques will be applied in order to
measure mutual performance, as well as the performance achieved by different method-
combinations. The application will be developed and tested on clinical notes from a
realistic Norwegian EHR-corpus. Finally, the application will be experimentally evalu-
ated by its ability to detect sensitive information, on a manually annotated reference
standard.
Supervisor: Øystein Nytrø, IDI
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Norsk Sammendrag
Helsevesenet har de senere a˚rene g˚att over fra papirbaserte til elektroniske pasientjour-
naler. Dette skaper en god del utviklingsmuligheter innen medisinsk forskning, pasient-
behandling og utdanning, ettersom det blir mulig a˚ nyttiggjøre digitale journaler p˚a
en helt ny m˚ate. For a˚ drive etisk forsvarlig medisinsk forskning p˚a pasientjournaler,
m˚a journalene avidentifiseres eller anonymiseres hvorved konfidensiell informasjon m˚a
henholdsvis erstattes eller fjernes. Manuell avidentifisering er en tidkrevende og kost-
bar prosess, som setter store begrensninger p˚a mengden pasientjournaler som blir gjort
tilgjengelig.
Ma˚let med denne oppgaven er derfor a˚ lage en automatisk avidentifiseringsapplikasjon
for norske kliniske fritekstnotater. Ettersom det ikke finnes tidligere studier direkte
relatert til automatisk avidentifisering av norske kliniske fritekstnotater, har vi brukt
en eksperimentell metode der vi utviklet en applikasjon basert p˚a et utvalg av flere
forskjellige metoder og eksperimenter. Disse har s˚a blitt evaluert i kombinasjon med
hverandre for a˚ oppn˚a best mulig resultat. Dette har ledet oss til en endelig versjon av
applikasjonen.
Applikasjonen er basert p˚a mønstergjenkjenningsteknikker i tillegg til en enkel statistisk
metode. Systemet er realisert p˚a en m˚ate som gir mulighet for justeringer av den statis-
tiske metoden, der forskjellige justeringer er testet for a˚ undersøke ytelsesforandringer.
Resultatene er evaluert mot 225 selvannoterte kliniske notater, hvorav disse er utvalgt
fra et realistisk pasientnotat-korpus. Systemets beste konfigurasjon gjenkjenner 77%
sensitive identifikatorer, med en presisjon p˚a 68%, samtidig som den lar store deler av
pasientnotatets ikke-sensitive innhold forbli intakt med en feilklassifisering (fallout) p˚a
5%.

Abstract
The conversion of paper-based health records to electronic health records creates new
opportunities within medical research, medical education and patient treatment. How-
ever, electronic health records have to be de-identified or anonymized before disclosure,
in order to conduct ethically sound research. Manual de-identification is time-consuming
and costly, and thus limits the amount of health records that can be disclosed for re-
search purposes.
The aim of this project was to develop an application for automatic or semi-automatic
de-identification for Norwegian free text clinical notes. As no directly related studies
have been performed on Norwegian clinical notes, our approach was highly experimental.
We have employed different methods and techniques. These have been evaluated in
different combinations to find the best match. The method combination which obtained
the best evaluation results constitutes our final de-identification application.
The application we have developed is based on pattern matching techniques and a
simple statistical method. It produces de-identified output which is evaluated against a
manually annotated reference standard consisting of 225 clinical notes. Our best system
configurations recognized 77% of the total 3320 sensitive identifiers, with a precision of
68%. Most of the insensitive contents remained intact with a fallout of 5%.
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Introduction
1.1 De-identification Overview
De-identification denotes the process of removing/replacing sensitive information. This
thesis propose to implement a de-identification application with the purpose of remov-
ing sensitive information from free text clinical notes. Automatic or semi-automatic
de-identification is getting more valuable as health records are stored digitally in Elec-
tronic Health Records. An Electronic Health Record (EHR) consists of several types of
documents, including medical history, allergies, laboratory results, pathology reports,
discharge summaries etc. Health data also contains a lot of sensitive information, in-
cluding name, date of birth, relatives, address and several other sensitive elements that
can be used to identify the person concerned. Sensitive information is legally privacy
protected, making EHRs visible to a limited audience.
When EHRs are de-identified, i.e. when confidential information and person identifiable
information are removed, these are legally outside the privacy protection which in turn
makes them available to a broader range of audience[2]. Large parts of medical research
are based on de-identified EHRs, but as practiced today, these EHRs are manually
de-identified. Conducting medical research needs an adequate amount of de-identified
data in order to reach statistically significant conclusions, whereby the validity of the
conclusions increases with the amount of data. Manual de-identification is time and
resource consuming, thus making automated or semi-automated de-identification tools
attractive. The win-win compromise allows analysts to use this information, while
preventing potential identity thieves from identifying the individuals.
By disclosing clinical documents and making them accessible to a wider range of audi-
ence, it might be easier to develop creative and innovative patient care tools, especially
with a view to technological progress within other fields as data mining and information
extraction (discussed in section 4.3.1). Tools can be developed for recognizing and tag
standard medical terminologies with the corresponding codes within an EHR, which
in turn can be used to enrich and adapt EHRs for other NLP-tools. Useful tools, like
decision support systems, can be developed for health care workers in order to make
proper decisions and somewhat provide relieve from the everyday stress.
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1.1.1 Evicare
The de-identification task is given by the Healthcare Informatics-section at Depart-
ment of Computer and Information Science (IDI) in connection with the Norwegian re-
search project EviCare (Evidence-based care process). The aim of the EviCare-project
is to develop valid tools, and produce high-quality research within the field of Clini-
cal Decision Support (CDS). In short, CDS systems are designed to assist health care
providers who have decision making tasks as a part of their daily activities, by con-
tributing with choices and decisions at the point of care. CDS is a major topic of
artificial intelligence in medicine[3].
De-identification systems are not directly related to CDS-systems in particular, but
we are still a part of the EviCare-team; having access to the same realistic corpus of
EHR-notes (described further in section 1.2.5) with the purpose of developing tools of
health care interest. We also cooperate during our research and utilize efforts across
projects. The EVICARE project-description can be found through Regional Commit-
tee for Medical and Health Research (REK)s homepage (see [4]), with the reference
number 2010/3380.
1.2 Assignment
This section presents our interpretation of the assignment, and the objectives we want
to accomplish through this project.
1.2.1 Problem Description
To facilitate medical research and sharing of medical health information from EHRs, the
content must be anonymised or pseudonomized in order to preserve patient confiden-
tiality. All sensitive information must either be removed or de-identified. Information
which can be used to identify an individual is considered as sensitive information. Such
information includes name, date of birth, sensitive information about relatives, address,
hospital name, patient number, workplace etc.
De-identification performed manually on large sets of EHRs is time-consuming, pro-
hibitively expensive and even error-prone[1]. Dorr et al.[5] evaluated the time cost to
manually de-identify narrative text notes (average of 87.2 ± 61 seconds per note), and
concluded that it was difficult to exclude all PHI required by Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA)1 (HIPAA is further described in section 2.10.1).
M. Douglas et al.[6] demonstrated that the recall (discussed in section 4.4.1) of a human
expert working alone ranged from 0.63 to 0.93, with an average of 0.81, whereas an al-
gorithm based on pattern matching, lookup lists and common sense heuristics achieved
a recall value of 0.85; consequently, methods for automatic de-identification are of both
medical research and commercial interest.
1 In US, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act has defined 18 personal health
identifiers, which are required to be removed from medical records before disclosure.
1.2. ASSIGNMENT 5
De-identification is an important step towards making clinical data more available and
facilitate for useful applications. Having access to automatic de-identification software
makes it more efficient and cost-effective to obtain a de-identified corpus of a desired
subset of clinical notes, for example leukemia2-patients with a specific blood type and
age, and further disclose the corpus for cancer-research or other objectives; In other
words, easier and cost-effective access to tailored corpuses. On a more general basis,
automatic or semi-automatic de-identification can serve good and valuable purposes
within medical education.
There are also several technological benefits. De-identified clinical notes are important
in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP) in order to develop new tools and
concepts for improving patient care, such as information extraction and information
retrieval. De-identified EHRs may provide more secure sharing of clinical data across
health institutions, which today is considered unsafe due to the degree of information
visibility.
Figure 1.1: A fictitious clinical note where red lettering expresses sensitive information.
In particular, the main objective of our project is to implement an application that
recognizes sensitive information in free text EHR-notes. The application will consist of
2A type of cancer of the blood or bone marrow
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
several modules performing de-identification on different levels (word, sentence, statis-
tical), whereby each module will function independently and their respective outcomes
will be further used to make decisions. The modules will be based on different tech-
niques, and as this approach is experimental, one sub-goal is to investigate the perfor-
mance of the modules (the research questions of this experimental approach is presented
in the next section). The application will be realized as a java based application, which
will be developed and tested on a realistic corpus. Finally, it will be evaluated on a
self-annotated reference standard (discussed in section 1.2.3), module by module and
in module-combinations experimentally, and measure its ability to detect sensitive in-
formation on a predefined set of patient notes. The performance will be measured in
recall, precision and f-measure, which are presented in section 4.4.
1.2.2 Research Questions
The main purpose of this project is to implement an application that detects sensitive
information in Norwegian EHR-notes. Further, the aim is to answer some research
questions. The primary goal is to make a best-effort applications. However, a certain
focus is also directed towards experimenting with different techniques and methodolo-
gies, rather than only focusing on the end-product. Our research questions reads as
follows:
• How well, in terms of recall, precision, fallout and f-measure, can we implement a
de-identification application in the course of a semester, on the basis of rule-based
and simple statistical methods?
• How will different combinations of the implemented algorithms and techniques
affect the performance?
• Can such a system be realized in the Norwegian health care system and re-
place/simplify manual annotation/de-identification?
The first and main question: How well, in terms of recall, precision and fallout, can we
implement a de-identification application in the course of a semester, on the basis of
rule-based and simple statistical methods? Considered the constraints of this project:
lack of a Norwegian gold standard, lack of annotated training data (for machine learning
purpose, see 4.3) and strict time limitation, the aim is to implement a best-effort de-
identification application within a semester (5 months). This question will be answered
by evaluating the performance through the performance measures recall, precision and
fallout against a self-annotated reference standard. The performance measures and and
the interpretation of these will be elaborated later, see section 4.4.
The second question: How will different combinations of modules and methods affect
the performance? Our approach will be to experimentally de-identify EHR-notes us-
ing different combinations of techniques; One-by-one or in various combinations. One
example would be to compare a regular expression-module combined with statistical
methods against dictionary lookup-module combined with statistical methods, and fur-
ther observe how well these perform together. It can be interesting to observe in which
cases wrong decisions are made due to disturbance between the modules, and to what
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extent the final decision of one module should be prioritized above another. This part
of the experiment will emphasize pros and cons of different techniques used in the appli-
cation. As far as the question is concerned, the answer will partially be used to sharpen
and finalize our application in order to achieve best possible performance and improve
the end-result according to the first research question. Furthermore, the answer may
serve as valuable information for further work on de-identification of Norwegian EHR
free text notes.
The last question: Can such a system be realized in the Norwegian health care system,
and replace/simplify manual annotation/de-identification? This question is more of a
discussion topic rather than a question to be answered through an experiment. Since
we already know that perfect de-identification applications for EHRs are very difficult,
if not impossible, to develop, we already know the partial answer to this question; Ex-
periments are broadly speaking needless to prove this. The purpose of asking such a
question is to look at issues related to automatic de-identification from different view-
points and open a more fundamental level of discussion of the challenges involved; what
is perfect de-identification/anonymization according to the legislation, who holds the
information (EHRs), constraints within the public health service’ information systems,
EHR-standards and their impacts, and to what extent our results can benefit today’s
practice.
1.2.3 Experiment
The experiment will consist of several parts, as mentioned in research question one and
two. The application will mainly employ (thoroughly described in chapter 5) regular
expressions (see 4.2.1.2) and reference works (see 4.2.1.1) together with simple statis-
tical methods, whereby the decisions made by the statistical methods will be based on
certain thresholds. Each of these will be implemented independently in such a way that
they easily can be enabled and disabled. Hence, the experimental approach is to run the
application using different combinations of the aforementioned methods, and use differ-
ent thresholds whenever the statistical methods are enabled. The obtained results will
form the basis for answering the second research question, and the method-combination
achieving best results will obviously constitute our final de-identification application.
Reference Standard
A selection of clinical notes from the Norwegian EHR-corpus will be annotated manually
in order to evaluate the performance. We will perform the annotation ourselves, which
will be somewhat simplified, as manual annotation is challenging and often carried out
by domain-experts. In order to make the best of the situation, our only choice is to
perform a best-effort annotation and prepare a simplified reference standard.
A more detailed description of reference standard and the annotation is provided in
chapter 11, under section 11.1.
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1.2.4 Constraints
There are several constraints affecting the project, these will be presented and discussed
in this section.
Time
The development of de-identification software is a time-consuming process and requires
a lot of organization and preparations. First of all, similar de-identification projects
from the state of the art review (chapter 4), shows that robust software based on
pattern matching requires a rich and comprehensive rule-base. The time is limited to
one semester (5 months), with a team consisting of two students. In order to develop a
comprehensive rule-base and other relevant functionalities we first have to get a basic
preprocessor going which will take some time, and then start off building the rule-base
which will be enriched gradually. The main challenge is to make generalized rules in
order to detect different types of sensitive information, on different types of clinical
notes, which requires incremental method of work by trying - failing - improving. Since
automated de-identification of free texts still is on a research stage internationally, there
is not any concrete solution to the task that can be followed; neither any directly related
work which can be built upon. Hence, the required preparations will place a noticeable
time-limitation on the project.
Almost all work will be done from scratch as no previous work directly relates to de-
identification of free text Norwegian clinical notes. This is the main reason for choosing
and framing our first research question, presented in the previous section (1.2.2): How
well, in terms of recall, precision and fallout, can we implement a de-identification
application in the course of a semester, on the basis of rule-based and simple statistical
methods? Knowing that other similar projects (see sec 4.5 and 4.6) have been conducted
by large and professional teams over long periods in contrast to our team consisting
of two students, we know it will be difficult, thus chose to not set any concrete and
unattainable goals which cannot be reached at the end of this semester. Hence, the
focus is to observe how well we are able to implement a de-identification application
within a semester, and additionally initialize a valuable project for the Norwegian health
care service.
Gold Standard
A significant part of an experiment is to perform a test with measurable outcome.
The performance of a de-identification application is often considered with respect to
a gold standard, which is a manually annotated corpus. A gold standard is worked
out by human judges (professionals, i.e. linguists or domain experts), where the de-
identification is based on a number of criteria. It does not exist any Norwegian gold
standard for our purpose. Consequently, we will not get the opportunity to compare our
results against a professional prepared solution, and are forced to define our own criteria.
Some phrases can be difficult to decide whether they reveal sensitive information or not,
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even for professional annotators. Hence, the lack of a gold standard is a major limitation
to the validity of the results.
The lack of any annotated data also makes it difficult to use machine learning algo-
rithms, because they need sufficient annotated training data. This is another apparent
limitation as it prevents us from make use of off-the-shelf machine learning tools, which
could have been of great value. Machine-learning based de-identification software has
shown to achieve satisfactory and robust results. A few machine learning approaches
will be presented later, in section 4.6.
Late Start
Since the EHR-notes contain extremely sensitive information, and several other students
needed access to the notes for their respective projects, IDI decided to set up a separate
lab. This lab has restricted admission, limited to students who have relevant projects.
The EHR-lab was ready to use almost one and a half months after semester-start, thus
it took some time before we got the chance to test our application on real EHR-notes
and discover the corpus-related bugs.
1.2.5 Realistic EHR-notes
As part of the EviCare team we have access to EHR-notes. IDI received the data
this semester, intended for students working on EviCare-projects. The corpus contains
over 40000 various types of free text notes, based on 800 hospital stays. Another
feature of the corpus is that among the 800 patients, there are 152 known patients with
Central Venous Catheter (CVK). Furthermore, the dataset also include a partitioned
sample in which the corpus has been divided into ten subsets, whereof each subset
contains equal quantity of CVK-patients. However, these features are contemplated to
students working on projects related to classification of medical contents in the notes, in
case someone wants to perform a 10-fold cross validation. In terms of de-identification,
these features are rather irrelevant.
The corpus is located on a net-disconnected server inside a separate lab which is a
sensitive and secure zone. The files are handed over in text (UTF-8) – and html format.
The naming of the text files also follows a pre-defined pattern, and reveals certain
information about the notes, in order to follow particular patients or dates. This is also
a less relevant property, thus not utilized by our de-identification application.
1.2.6 Simplifications
It is often a challenge to identify sensitive information, even manually[1]. The main
challenge is to decide on what should be classified as so-called indirectly identifiable
information, which will be explained in 2.4.2. In short, the annotator has to assume the
knowledge of a potential intruder, and foresee that this knowledge together with the dis-
closed information do not link to an individual. The automation of this process requires
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complex analysis in which κ-anonymity and `-diversity (discussed in section 2.10.3),
among others, are frequently used techniques. These are often used on structured data
and require structuring of the free text notes, which in turn is more than we are able
to do within a semester.
We have made some simplifications and narrowed down the range of information re-
garded as sensitive, whereby purely context based indirectly identifiable information
will not be considered, such as: demographic information, background information and
information revealing living conditions and circumstances. Below follows examples of
phrases revealing such information:
• The patient has a daughter and a son
• Drug addict, bruised face and missing incisors
• Served in the war against Iraq for two years, lost three of his closest buddies,
clearly traumatized
All of these sentences reveals indirectly identifiable information. The first example
reveals that a patient has a daughter and a son. This piece of information is enough to
significantly narrow the range of potential individuals, and further identify the person
concerned by additional knowledge or information that might as well be present in the
EHR.
The same applies for the two latter examples, besides, these also reveal recognizable
characteristics which actually might be utilized to directly identify the concerned indi-
viduals.
1.3 Report Outline
The rest of the report is organized as follows:
1.3.1 Part II
Chapter 2 introduces relevant Norwegian legislation related to de-identification. The
chapter provides a basic understanding of personal privacy and patient security,
together with an explanation of de-identified, anonymized and pseudonymized
patient data, and further the legislative limitations regarding the access and pro-
cessing of clinical documents.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of EHRs, and further discusses the opportunities and
challenges brought into light by the technological progress within the health sector,
as well as the impact of an automatic de-identification application.
Chapter 4 presents relevant de-identification techniques, with main focus on machine
learning and pattern matching methods, followed by a state of the art investiga-
tion.
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1.3.2 Part III
Chapter 5 provides a short and basic overview of the implemented application.
Chapter 6 describes the implementation of the preprocessor, and how the clinical
documents are prepared by our application, before the actual de-identification.
Chapter 7, 8, 9 describes the implementation of the pattern matching- and statistical
component together with the classification algorithm, respectively, and provides
detailed description of the implemented techniques, as well as the choices that
have been made during the development.
Chapter 10 describes the implementation of the postprocessor.
1.3.3 Part IV
Chapter 11 explains the preparations that were made to facilitate the experiment.
Chapter 12 presents the results.
Chapter 13 provides a discussion about the reliability of the obtained results, and
decisive sources of errors.
Chapter 14 summarizes the project and provides a conclusion by answering the ini-
tially asked research questions.
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Part II
Background
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2
Legislation
Automatic or semi-automatic de-identification of free text clinical notes can be time-
efficient, cost-effective and as good as manual de-identification[1][6]. The solution of the
task mainly involves technical and scientific methods within text technology and NLP,
however, it is equally important to analyze and get familiar with the actual problem
before jumping to the conclusion. In our case, the main obstacle is the Norwegian legis-
lation that places certain limitations on disclosure of health information. This chapter
gives a brief overview of relevant rules and regulations according to Norwegian legisla-
tion, and provides legislative restrictions that forms the basis for the de-identification
task.
2.1 Personal Health Data
Research on personal health data is regulated by the Health Research Act [7], where
the purpose is to promote secure and ethically sound health research. As a matter of
form, it is appropriate to provide the definition of personal health data, as a start-up,
in regard to our actual motivation of de-identifying health data. According to §4 in the
Health Research Act, personal health data is defined as:
”Confidential information pursuant to §21 of the Health Personnel Act and
other information and assessments concerning health issues or that are sig-
nificant for health issues that can be linked to an individual person.”
The clause mentions confidential information as a part of personal health data, which
in turn is defined in the Health Personnel Act [8], cf. §21:
”Health personnel shall prevent others from gaining access to or knowledge of
information relating to people’s health or medical condition or other personal
information that they get to know in their capacity as health personnel.”
As per the above-mentioned paragraphs, EHRs are considered as personal health data,
and hence have to comply with these.
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Handling personal health data is comprised by rigid and strict regulations, which in
turn ensures organized and responsible research. There are also several other acts
which deals with personal health data, supplementing the Health Research Act (cf. §2
third paragraph), i.e. Personal Data Act [9] and Personal Health Data Filing System
Act [10], whereby the latter will be further described in connection with health registers
(discussed in 2.9). The essence of the Health Research Act is to maintain personal
privacy and patient security.
2.1.1 Personal Privacy
The law of privacy is defined in the Personal Data Act [9]. Personal privacy mainly
consists of two parts, personal integrity and personal data. Personal integrity deals with
the social perspective of individual privacy as self-determination and self-expression,
such as freedom of speech. Put differently, the right to live an autonomous and private
life. Personal data privacy on the other hand, is more of our interest and defines
norms and standards for processing personal data. The aim is to ensure that each
individual controls the publicly available knowledge about his/her private situation
(social status, age, address etc) . This is often interpreted as the technical part of
personal privacy. It states that every individual has the ability to control when-, how-
and how much personal information is disclosed to other parties. Personal privacy
follows from ”the European Convention on Human Rights (EMK) - article 8” , and
provides a right to respect for one’s private and family life. Privacy is thus a basic
human right that must be respected in all circumstances, hence also highly relevant
within the health sector.
The public health service is dependent on health information in order to give each pa-
tient proper and individualized health care. Information concerning illnesses, diseases,
lifestyle, habits and other health related information is substantial to the health ser-
vice in order to provide best possible treatment. In worst case, the lack of adequate
personal health information may lead to wrong treatment; hence access to personal
health information is necessary. Health care providers are obliged to keep secret all
acquired information about patients in the course of their professional work. This is
regulated by the Health Personnel Act [8], which has to be complied by doctors, nurses,
physiotherapists and all kind of health personnel.
2.2 Medical and Health Research
There are two clauses in the Health Research Act[7] §13 & §20 which frames the terms
for this very project. The first clause, cf. §13, states:
”Consent must be obtained from participants in medical and health research,
unless otherwise laid down in law.”
Personal health data is privacy protected, hence consents from respective participants
are demanded. This has to be complied with when performing research on personal
health data. Hence, when medical research projects depend on health data together
2.3. ANONYMIZATION 17
with the belonging person identifiable information (described in 2.4), consent is required
from each and every participant, at least pursuant to the principal rule. There are some
exceptions to this rule, but they are rather irrelevant in our case. Even if consents are
acquired, medical research cannot be conducted on health data without further ado. In
addition, an application has to be prepared and further evaluated by the REK, pursuant
to the Health Research Act, §33:
”Research projects must have authority to process data. Prior approval from
the regional committee for medical and health research ethics (REK) in ac-
cordance with Chapter 3 is necessary and adequate authority to process per-
sonal health data in medical and health research. REK is an administrative
body, and has to follow The Public Administration Act when considering
applications for medical research.”
Applications are thoroughly examined by REK in order to assure that projects preserve
personal privacy, and promote ethically acceptable medical and health research. Our
very EviCare-project (described in 1.1.1) was examined in a similar manner before
disclosing the Norwegian EHR-notes corpus.
2.3 Anonymization
Medical research projects on health data can vary regarded purpose, size, budget, period
of time etc., and the kind of health data required for the projects depends accordingly.
Such variations may include document types, structured or unstructured data, specific
diseases, geographic distribution and several other specifications. However, the common
property of research corpora is often high quantity; Research projects often requires a
sufficient amount of data in order to obtain statistically significant results, which in turn
involves procurement of consents from each participant. Consequently, big datasets will
demand a lot of consents, which in turn is time-consuming and costly. However, §20
of the Health Research Act[7] provide a means of solution to this impracticality, and is
the other main clause defining the boundaries for our project:
”Consent is not required for research on anonymous human biological mate-
rial and anonymous data.”
As addressed in the beginning of this chapter, the main purpose of the Health Research
Act is to promote ethically sound medical and health research, whereby one of the
many risks is that health data falls into the wrong hands. However, when sensitive
information is removed from the persona health data, the health data is not considered
personal anymore, as it no longer meets the requirements (2.1), cf. §4, Health Research
Act , whereby the consents are needless. This alternative may be more suitable for
projects conducting medical research purely on the medical contents of health data,
independent of identifiable information.
Research on anonymous data still requires approval from REK, cf. §35, the Health
Research Act. Furthermore, the legislation defines three levels of anonymization that can
be performed before disclosure, whereby each level is anonymized differently depending
on the purpose, and more importantly, by REK’s judgment.
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Further, the distinction between directly and indirectly identifiable information will be
explained, before moving onto the three anonymization-levels.
2.4 Directly and Indirectly Identifiable Information
Information is often divided in sensitive and insensitive information, whereby sensitive
information is subdivided in directly and indirectly identifiable information.
2.4.1 Directly Identifiable Information
Directly identifying information is information about an individual X, wherewith this
information exclusively, individual X can be identified. Evident examples of such in-
formation are name, address and phone number. This type of information usually easy
to catch, and there is rarely any doubt whether a string of characters signifies directly
identifying information. Besides, if there should be any doubt, the information is most
probably indirectly identifying and hence has to be removed.
2.4.2 Indirectly Identifiable Information
Indirectly identifiable information does not reveal any identity in itself, but on the
other hand exposes explicit identifying variables (gender, age, county, municipality etc.)
which can be used to reveal the concerned individual’s identity, by combining the dis-
closed variables with certain background information. Such background information is
called quasi-identifiers[11]. Hence, the patient referred to in a clinical note wherein di-
rect identifying information is removed, can still be re-identified by a potential intruder
if he knows exactly the right quasi-identifiers.
Quasi-identifiers may come from various types of registers which are made publicly
available or just common knowledge acquired through internet or acquaintance. For
instance birth registers; it is quite common that parents announce the exact weight of
their babies after the birth. Assuming a publicly available birth register with the age of
mother, hospital of birth and the baby’s weight, the age will make most births unique.
Hence, the baby’s exact weight can turn out to be a powerful quasi-identifier, providing
potential intruders to obtain mothers age and hospital of birth.
2.5 Anonymous Health Data
The definition of anonymous health data is given by the Health Data Filing System
Act [10], 2nd section, 4th paragraph:
”Data from which the name, national identity number and other character-
istics serving to identify a person have been removed, so that the data can
no longer be linked to an individual person.”
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Note that it should be impossible to link anonymous data to an individual, something
which never can be guaranteed unless everything is removed from the document. In
order to perform perfect anonymization, one must be familiar with all knowledge the
receiving party holds, including background information (quasi-identifiers 2.4.2), which
in turn is impossible. The risk of linking attacks (described in 2.10.2) makes the task of
anonymization challenging and requires that all possible quasi-identifiers are carefully
considered such that a sufficient amount of variables are removed, in order to declare the
data as anonymous. Sometimes, this also involves that medical contents are removed
from the data, for example due to a rare and recognizable disease, which unfortunately
results in research material of poor quality.
As practiced today, a dataset is anonymous if the information can be associated to 4
or 5 individuals[2]. In theory, a dataset is anonymous as long as it can be linked to 2
individuals. However, as more information is digitized the risk of information leakage
through unauthorized access increases, thus the limitation is adjusted accordingly.
2.6 Pseudonymous Health Data
Pseudo is Greek for false whereby a pseudonym is used to give patients false identities.
Pseudonymous health data is health data, in which directly and indirectly identifying
information is replaced with pseudonyms. For instance the name Peter could be replaced
with the string AXB77, in which AXB77 is the pseudonym, with a direct mapping to
the name Peter. Pseudonymizing health data provides the possibility to follow patients
over a period of time by their pseudonymous identity, and most importantly without
identifying the concerned individuals in real life. The is also possible across some health
registers, which will be further described in section 2.9. This possibility adds a new
dimension for researchers and might be very valuable.
The definition of pseudonymous health data is given by the Health Data Filing System
Act [10]:
Personal health data where the identity has been encrypted or otherwise
concealed, and nonetheless individualized serving the possibility to follow
each patient through the health system without the identity being revealed.
It is required that a system for person-unique pseudonymisation is established by a
trusted third party or a so-called Trusted Pseudonym Agency (TPF). One example of a
trusted pseudonym agency is Central Bureau of Statistics (SSB). The main principle is
that no authority should have access to both the health data and the mapping between
the pseudonyms and the true identity. For instance, the Prescription Register [12] which
is a central health register (see section 2.9), is a register containing pseudonym health
data where SSB is the corresponding TPF. Figure 2.1 provides an simple illustration:
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Figure 2.1: SSB encrypts national identification numbers into pseudonyms [13]
2.7 De-identified Health Data
A medical record is considered de-identified if the sensitive information is replaced by
some value, which has a direct mapping to the original information. The difference
between de-identified and pseudonymized health data is that the replacement value is
independent of the original information in de-identification, whereas pseudonymized
data does. Hence, the national identification number for patient X can be replaced
with the string AAB in one note, and BBA in the other. The mapping is required to
be stored apart from the holders of the de-identified data. The mapping is usually held
by a trusted body, i.e SSB.
The definition of de-identified health data is given by the Health Data Filing System
Act [10]:
”Personal health data from which the name, national identification number
and other characteristics serving to identify a person must be removed, so
that the data can no longer be linked to an individual person, and where the
identity can only be traced through alignment with the same data that were
previously removed.”
Since the recipient of de-identified data not has access to the mapping, re-identification
should not be possible, hence the data will appear as anonymous to the recipient.
Figure 2.2: Illustration of the clincal data types. left: Anonymous, center: Pseudony-
mous, right: De-identified
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2.8 Comparison
As illustrated on figure 2.2, exactly the same information is removed from all three types,
with the difference being that the removed information in anonymous health data isn’t
replaced by any value or key, just censored. This is what separates anonymous data from
the other two types. On the other hand, the replaced value in de-identified health data
won’t be of any use for the recipient of the data, and thus will appear as anonymous.
Further, the only difference between de-identified data and pseudonymous data is that
the replacement key/value in pseudonymous health data depends on the actual value.
In other words, every individual has a unique pseudonym which provides the recipient
a link to a patient, and thereby follow this patient through the health system. Hence,
the pseudonyms are useless without the mapping considered re-identification purposes,
and thus are anonymous to the recipient.
2.9 Health Registers
Health Registers are filing systems where health information about patients is system-
atically stored, in which an individual can be able to track his belonging health data.
The registers are either stored electronic or as hard copies. There are two types of
registers: Central Health Registers (Norwegian: ”Sentrale helseregistre”) and Medical
Quality Registers (Norwegian: ”Medisinsk kvalitetsregistre”). Central Health Registers
contains nationwide health information and mainly established to monitor the state of
health on a national scale, maintain and improve the health service, and to conduct
medical research. The health data is fetched from health care institutions, and is contin-
uously updated in order to get reliable information about present state of health and to
quickly detect new patterns. The Cancer Register (Norwegian: ”Kreftregisteret”) and
The Vaccination Register (Norwegian: ”Nasjonalt Vaksinasjonsregister”) are examples
of central health registers. The medical quality registers are used to ensure the quality
of treatment, but also used for research purposes.
There are a total of 15 central health registers and about 200 medical quality registers.
These are stored as either person-identifiable form, de-identified form or pseudonomized
form. A noteworthy fact is that research projects on health data from these registers
is controlled by the Personal Health Data Filing System Act [10]. This is explicitly
clarified in theHealth Research Act [7] cf. second paragraph of §2 (referred to earlier
2.1), explicitly states:
”The Act does not apply to establishment of health registers.”
The intention is that the establishment of registers whereby subsequent processing of
health data is governed by Personal Health Data Filing System Act. However, when
it comes to medical research, we need to keep steady hands. The Health Research Act
applies to all types of concrete medical and health research projects. Hence, if a register
is established as a part of a concrete medical and health research project, the Health
Research Act will be the prevailing regulation. However, if a register is established
without any concrete aim and independently of a medical and health research project,
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for instance as entry to future projects, the Personal Health Data Filing System Act
will apply[2]. Hence, even if a health register is established under the provisions of
Personal Health Data Filing System Act, the specific use of the health data from the
registers will be under the jurisdiction of Health Research Act, if it is for medical and
health research purpose.
As mentioned, the health registers are realized in either: person-identifiable, de-identified
or pseudonymous form. This is pursuant to §7 and §8 in Personal Health Data Filing
System Act, which governs the establishment of medical quality registers and central
health registers respectively, stating:
”... The name, national identity number or other characteristics that directly
identify a natural person may only be processed with the consent of the data
subject. The latter’s consent is not necessary if the regulations provide that
the personal health data may only be processed in pseudonymized or de-
identified form ...”
This excerpt from the Personal Health Data Filing System Act is of significant im-
portance for our project as it denotes that consents are needless when processing de-
identified or pseudonymized health data. Hence, whether it comes to a concrete health
and medical research project or just the establishment of a health register, automatic or
semi-automatic de-identification will in both cases be time-saving, which is the actual
reason for mentioning the health registers in first place.
Furthermore, there are several rules and regulations on the anonymization levels de-
scribed above, regarding medical research. However, a detailed study of the legislative
framework for medical research is outside the scope of this paper, whereas adequate
legislation still has been covered for our purpose. The main reason for presenting these
three types is to clarify why sensitive information, is replaced or removed with a view
to the legislation.
The manual process of locating and replacing sensitive information before it is disclosed
is extremely time-consuming and expensive[1]. The importance of medical research is
quite obvious, however, the premises are clear; anonymity must be maintained. This is
what forms the basis for our task, namely automatic de-identification
2.10 Relevant Theory
This chapter has presented the legislative definition of directly and indirectly iden-
tifiable information together with anonymous, de-identified and pseudonymous data.
Although clinical documents are adapted to fit within the legislative boundaries, it is
always discussable whether the personal privacy is sufficiently protected. Automatic de-
identification studies conducted in other countries signifies just this challenge of privacy
preservation, which will be presented in chapter 4. However, existing de-identification
studies have been prepared and developed within their respective legislative bound-
aries, whereby a majority of these are conducted in the US. This section presents a
brief overview of the juridical definitions in the US, which also are used outside the US
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(e.g. Sweden[14], Canada[15]) due to clear guidelines, followed by the weaknesses of
these guidelines.
2.10.1 Protected Health Information (PHI)
HIPAA[16] dictates allowed contents of disclosed patient information. The HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule specifies; patient data accessibility, the circumstances in which patient data
can be disclosed and between whom. Also in the US, clinical data must be de-identified
in order to be disclosed for research purpose. However, the HIPAA Safe Harbour stan-
dard defines 18 specific categories of patient data elements that must be removed before
the data can be shared. Such information is called Protected Health Information (PHI)
and is sensitive health information, or any information contained inside patient docu-
mentation (including medical records or payment history) that can be used to identify
the patient. Hence, in contrast to Norwegian legislation, the Safe Harbor standard pro-
vides somewhat clearer provisions for de-identification, by providing an explicit listing of
health information that is regarded sensitive. The following identifiers of the individual
or of relatives, employers, or household members of the individual, are removed [16]:
• Names
• All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street address, city,
county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes, except for the initial
three digits of a zip code if, according to the current publicly available data from
the Bureau of the Census
• Dates (other than year) directly related to an individual
• Telephone numbers
• Fax numbers
• Electronic mail addresses
• Social security numbers
• Medical record numbers
• Health plan beneficiary numbers
• Account numbers
• Certificate/license numbers
• Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers
• Device identifiers and serial numbers
• Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs)
• Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers
• Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints
• Full face photographic images and any comparable images;
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• Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, except the unique
code assigned by the investigator to code the data
Although clinical documents are de-identified pursuant to the HIPAA-specific identi-
fiers, re-identification will always be possible [17]. HIPAA is too naive in today’s data
rich society because other data sources often exist that contain some or all of the same
values, allowing redacted identity information to be restored by linking datasets [17].
Record linking is a common technique used to perform re-identification, and will be
presented in next section.
A corresponding list of identifiers in Norwegian is not defined by the legislation. Hence,
an essential issue is to decide whether the de-identification is satisfactory. However,
Oslo university hospital has defined a set of sensitive identifiers, but in addition also
emphasizes the removal of these might be insufficient. Their internal rule states that the
information is satisfactory de-identified if and only if it prevents a link to a group of 3-5
individuals [18] (mentioned in section 2.5). We will use Oslo University Hospital’s list of
sensitive identifiers as a basis for de-identification. The list is not explicitly realized as
presented below, however the composition of the following list is based on their internal
guidelines for de-identification which is available on the Internet. [19]:
• Name
• National identification number
• Address
• Zip code
• Phone number
• Fax number
• Birth date
• Hospitalization and conscription date
• Patient number
• Bank account number
• Driver’s license number
• Car registration number
• Link to personal web pages
• Mail addresses
• Biometric characteristics
• Photos
• Information about ethnicity
• Political point of view
• Religion
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• Sexual relations
• Memberships in labor unions
2.10.2 Record Linkage
The purpose of removing HIPAA-specified[16] PHI is to prevent/minimize the pos-
sibility of re-identification. However, such lists will never rule out the possibility of
re-identification since we know that perfect anonymization is impossible, due to quasi-
identifiers. One common re-identification technique is Record linkage.
The process of combining quasi-identifiers with a disclosed anonymous dataset and
perform re-identification is called linking attacks. This is a common re-identification
approach. The main idea of record linkage is to associate pairs between two lists of
tuples, and use this to derive sensitive information about individuals.
One example is the re-identification carried out by Dr. Latanya Sweeney [11]. The
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC) decided to release ”anonymized”
(HIPAA-specific) data on state employees that showed every single hospital visit, with
the purpose of helping researchers. Every obvious identifier was removed, such as name,
address and national identification number, and William Weld (Governor at that time)
assured that patient privacy was maintained in the dataset. However, to make a point
and prove the limits of anonymization, Dr. Sweeney re-identified the Governor’s health
records, including prescriptions and diagnoses, and sent them to his office. Through
the re-identification ”attack”, she surprisingly revealed that 87% of the US population
could be identified by just ZIP codes, date of birth and gender. Sweeney carried out a
linking attack by purchasing voter rolls from the city of Cambridge and combined this
information with the GIC records.
Furthermore she states that about half of the US population (132 of 248 million) are
likely to be uniquely identified by only place, gender and date of birth, where place is
basically the city, town or municipality in which the person resides [20].
2.10.3 κ-Anonymity and `-diversity
The abovementioned example illustrates the weaknesses of HIPAA-specific[16] PHI and
other specified lists of identifiers. Some proposed methods for preventing attacks on
structured data is κ-anonymity [11] and `-diversity [21]. A κ-anonymised dataset has
the property that that each record is similar to at least κ-1 other records with respect
to ”identifying”variables. Hence, worst case scenario for a κ-anonymous released dataset
is that it narrows down an individual entry to a group of κ individuals. The following
example shows a database that is 2-anonymized by suppressing a few variables.
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Figure 2.3: Rows 1 and 3 are identical and rows 2 and 4 are identical (equivalence
classes). [22]
However, Machanavajjhala et al.[23] addressed the limitation of κ-anonymity, and
showed that κ-anonymity does not guarantee privacy against attackers, using back-
ground knowledge. κ-anonymity prevents identity disclosure, but not attribute disclo-
sure. Assume that an intruder has access to a disclosed data set which is 5-anonymous.
This data set alone can not be used to identify the individuals. But if the intruder is
interested in a particular attribute, e.g. medical diagnosis, and all 5 are flagged with
cancer, then the data set implicitly reveals that the person the intruder intends to iden-
tify, has cancer. This is called a homogenity attack, after which Machanavajjhala et
al. [23] introduced a new notion of privacy, called `-diversity. `-diversity requires that
the distribution of a sensitive attribute in each equivalence class has at least ` well-
represented values. Figure 2.4 illustrates how the level of anonymity of a 4-anonymous
table (left) can be improved, by modifying it into a 3-diversive table (right).
Figure 2.4: Left: 4-anonymous table right: 3-diversive table. [23]
The sensitive identifier in the 3-diversive table has three well represented values: heart
disease, viral infection and cancer. Using the 3-diversive, we no longer are able to tell
if our ”neighbor” Bob (a 31 year old American from zip code 13053) has cancer, which
can be derived from the 4-anonymous table. We also cannot tell if our ”colleague”
Umeko (a 21 year old Japanese from zip code 13068) has viral infection or cancer.
Machanavajjhala et al.[23] have shown that the `-diversity algorithms provide a stronger
level of privacy than κ-anonymity routines.
κ-anonymity and `-diversity are techniques to generalize information and prevent re-
identification. However, these techniques are limited to structured data and requires
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the structuring of free text notes before they can be utilized. There are tools to pro-
cess text-based data, and extract coded data from standardized nomenclatures such
as Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine Clinical Terms (SNOMED)[24], which can
be used to structure free text clinical notes and further anonymized. However, this
is a different approach to the de-identification task than the one we have chosen (see
implemenation 5), thus these techniques will not be utilized.
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3
Medical Records
As our task deals with EHRs, it is appropriate to know what a health record actually
is and contain. This section provides an overview of EHRs in general and its main
components, together with the opportunities and challenges that come into light from
the technological development.
3.1 Electronic Health Records
A medical record is one of the most important tools health care providers holds. Medical
records have been used in Norway since 18th century and, internationally before 17th
century. A health record is systematic clinical documentation of the health care that
has been received. The EHR is an individual journal, recorded by a specific person with
a specific profession within health care. Hence, an individual can have several EHRs
at various clinics or health units/institutions such as psychologists, physiotherapists,
doctors etc. Digital health records are called electronic health records (EHRs), in which
the journaling is carried out through EHR-systems (discussed in 3.2), pursuant to the
Health Personnel Act §46[8].
There are certain demands for the content of health records, cf. §8 in Regulation on
health records [25], in which there are defined 21 items that should be included if they
are relevant and necessary. The reason for explicitly stating “relevant and necessary”
is because the 21 items considers a number of various conditions and scenarios, i.e.
enforcement(r) or (drug addiction), hence not always necessary and relevant. The
items are presented in the appendix A, however the essence of the paragraph is simply
to include all medically related information about the patient, closest relatives, dates,
health care providers, and sufficient personal information in order to make identification
possible.
Medical records consist of both, structured and unstructured data. Structured docu-
mentation contains a fixed structure, where the information is recorded point by point
and follows certain criterions. Unstructured data, on the other hand, is free form notes
dictated straight into the record by the clinicians, of their observations and commen-
tary. Examples of this type are discharge summaries and physician notes. EHRs also
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contains non-textual elements, i.e. X-rays, CT scans and MR.
3.2 EMR-systems
Since health care providers are obliged to make a note of the medical help provided to
patients, this implies that patients have to disclose personal information in order to re-
ceive medical help, cf. Health Personnel Act §39[8]. It is required that EHR-systems are
established on organizational level, meaning that institutions/clinics providing health
care are to establish a health record system. The obligation of documentation incum-
bent on each and every health care providing individual, and the record-systems must
be designed in order to comply with the law.
3.3 Benefits
In addition to personal health care, the health sector is under constant pressure of
improving their services: Treat more patients, implement new - tools, methods and
technologies, increase quality and security and ensure cost-effectiveness. At the same
time, personal information and personal health information requires safety, and the
health sector has to maintain the information during these changes, both legally and
practically.
EHRs have improved a lot of processes in the health sector, and is more effective and
practical to use than non-electronic health records. The rapid progress in Informa-
tion and Communications Technology (ICT) facilitates quick and precise distribution
of EHRs and makes the information available to health care providers. One of the
main advantages is the simplicity of sharing health records across different health care
institutions, assuming smart and fast sharing-systems between them. However, this
assumption is far-fetched as it demands a thorough renovation of todays ICT-systems,
which is unlikely to be realized in the near future (see section 3.5).
ICT tools can provide the opportunity to easily verify that the records are up to date
by logging the modifications made in a health record. Faster access to precise and
necessary patient information may lead to more efficient treatment.
Moreover, with the reality of encryption and access control, the information remains
safe and better secured against unauthorized access. Another major advantage is that
medical and health research can be performed more efficiently by exploiting statistical
tools like data mining (see section 4.3.1).
3.4 Issues
There is a somewhat danger to the realization of the abovementioned opportunities
which might go at the sacrifice of personal privacy. EHRs contain a lot of sensitive
information, whereby easier access to the information makes it easier to misuse, which
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is a challenge in terms of EHR-sharing across institutions. The legislation clarifies con-
straints regarding information sharing across institutions, cf.Health Register Act §13[26]:
”Only persons responsible for managing data or persons working on their
command, may be granted access to health information to the extent that this
is necessary for the work and in accordance with confidentiality provisions.”
The latter part of this act prevents direct information sharing between health institu-
tions. Information sharing in accordance to personal confidentiality is difficult without
a satisfactory national infrastructure with access control and logging opportunities. It
is a necessity to know who the information seeker is, and to whom the information will
be exposed to.
Development and improvements within the health sector brings changes internally and
across different health institutions, and there is doubt whether the maintenance and
protection of personal health information keeps up during the improvements of the
system. This allegation was made by The privacy commission, who published a detailed
study in 2009, “Individ og integritet – Personvern i det digitale samfunn”[27]. This is
a wide study and includes a lot of subjects relevant to personal privacy, where for our
purpose it also discuss issues and challenges regarding personal privacy in the health
sector.
The study reveals that computer systems used in health sector do not provide satis-
factory security of the patient information. One specific problem addressed is that the
information flows across all user-levels within the institutions, and redundant informa-
tion is being exposed. Even though there are several exceptions, the general rule states
that only health care providers have legitimate access to health records. This rule is not
followed properly within health care clinics/institutions. Too much data is accessible
to employees without a legitimate need.[27]
Furthermore, The Norwegian Data Inspectorate has conducted a number of inspections
on health institutions and revealed unsatisfactory practice[28][29]. The Norwegian Data
Inspectorate is an independent administrative body, and their task is to monitor and
control that the Personal Data Act is followed. The Data Protection Authority expects
better practice and even sent a letter (2008) to Health – and Care Department in
which they proclaim that illegitimate EHR access threatens personal confidentiality in
hospitals[27].
3.5 De-identification
One way to improve the weaknesses addressed by The Privacy commission and The
Norwegian Inspectorate is to arrange for customized access on all levels. However,
there is still a great need for standardization and coordination of information - and
communication systems, in order to ensure that the patient privacy is maintained and
national guidelines are followed by every institution. To put it in a realistic perspective,
Helse Sør-Øst, which is one among four Norwegian regional health authorities, has a
total of 3500 digital systems with relevant health information. Hence, standardization
will require a lot of time.
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Today’s practice is to either omit information about personal characteristics and all
non-medical information before sharing the data with the requesting institution, or by
directly requesting the patient concerned. Both of these alternatives comply with the
legislation[27]. These processes, however, are time consuming and will not be as efficient
as direct information access, indicating the need of automatic de-identification, which
also was concluded in the investigation conducted by The Privacy Committee, which
states:
“The technical possibilities’ EMR gives for de-identification and other meth-
ods to hide identity should be fully utilized“.
Automatic or semi-automatic de-identification of free text health records first of all
simplifies the very de-identification process which today is performed manually, reducing
the time-consumption and in turn the costs.
By assuming access to such an application, it provides the opportunity to de-identify
a significantly higher amount of clinical documents and finalize these manually within
the same amount of time it takes to perform the whole process manually. Consequently,
more de-identified clinical data will be available for various applications as health re-
search, data mining and education, and provide researchers and operations with greatly
increased access to patient data, thereby combining sources of data previously unavail-
able.
The need for such an application increases accordingly with the technological progress
within the health sector. The increasing use of EHR-systems simplifies illegitimate
exposure to confidential information, and is thus easier to misuse. As per the inspections
revealing unsatisfactory security of patient privacy byThe Norwegian Inspectorate and
the statement made by The Privacy Committee, automatic de-identification may serve
as a partial solution to patient privacy issues, and at the same time improve patient
treatment.
4
State of the Art
Automatic or semi-automatic de-identification of free text clinical notes is becoming
more relevant as medical records are being converted to Electronic Medical Records
(EMR). The opportunities and benefits have been considered for a while by the Nor-
wegian healthcare (as per the Privacy Commission’s statement 3.5), but rather few
serious attempts have been made to develop such a tool. However, there has been con-
ducted a series of attempts by various research communities in other parts of the world,
experimenting with different methodologies.
As a preliminary study for this project, a state of the art investigation was performed
last semester, where the main focus was to look at different tools and techniques used
for de-identification purpose, on different languages. This chapter will not repeat the
investigation in particular, but rather provide a summary and point out the key obser-
vations, directly relevant for our project.
4.1 Methods
Technically, de-identification of free text clinical notes is a binary classification problem,
with the purpose of classifying a sequence of text as either sensitive or insensitive. The
complexity of this task increases significantly when dealing with free texts as it requires
semantic analysis in order to interpret the text. There isn’t any precise solution to the
task of de-identification, however, the state of the art investigation shows that broadly
two types of techniques are used: pattern matching (see 4.5) and machine learning
(see 4.6), or sometimes a hybrid (see 4.7) of these. Pattern matching and machine
learning are essential techniques used in NLP, hence the two following sections will
briefly explain these techniques with a view to de-identification. Further, a selection of
the various de-identification approaches from the state of the art investigation will be
presented together with their respective evaluation results.
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4.2 Pattern Matching
Pattern matching is a term in computer science and denotes the procedure of recog-
nizing predetermined text-sequences. The main cycles of a pattern matching approach
is: chunk input text into self-defined textual units (often called tokens) - process the
text-units – locate desired text patterns - and finally perform desired operations with
the retrieved text. Tokens can be characters, words, sentences or paragraphs. Prede-
termined patterns can occur in a lot of unexpected ways, causing ambiguities, which
requires in-depth analysis. Several techniques are used to carry out such analysis, which
will be described in the further sections.
It is important to separate the two terms, pattern matching and pattern recognition.
Pattern recognition is a machine learning technique, denoting the likelihood of a match,
whereas in pattern matching, patterns usually have to match exactly. However, the
pattern recognition topic resumes in connection with machine learning in section 4.3.
Pattern matching is a huge field with a widespread range of applications, i.e. NLP,
image recognition, speech recognition and data mining. The following sections will
somewhat restrict the range, and only cover methods most relevant to de-identification.
4.2.1 Pattern Matching and De-identification
As mentioned above, de-identification of free text medical notes is a task of determining
a sequence of text as either sensitive or insensitive. In order to do so, one firstly has
to define what sensitive information involves, and further get familiarized with how
such information is shaped, when it typically occurs, and furthermore the context such
information occurs in. Pattern matching methods have to be adapted accordingly, in
order to make precise decisions.
Among the pattern matching approaches which were investigated last semester, there
are three very common techniques which are utilized in almost every approach: Ref-
erence works, regular expressions and Part of Speech (POS)-tags. The two former
techniques will be described in the following sections, whereas POS-tagging will be
described in section 4.3.3.
4.2.1.1 Reference Works
De-identification applications based on pattern matching are quite dependent on ref-
erence works. Reference works can be described as the supporting beam of such ap-
plications as they constitute a substantial part of the systems. The reason is quite
simple; smallest units in a text providing semantics (meaning) are words (or acutally
morphemes to be linguistically correct). And to interpret a phrase/sentence, the words
have to be analyzed in order to extract a meaning out of the phrase/sentence. However,
it is tremendously challenging to make a computer interpret human language due to
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the complexity1. Hence, the task of semantic extraction has to be somewhat simplified.
One cheap way to weed out sensitive text is to locate sensitive words/terms by means of
reference works, whereby the contents of the reference works are classified as sensitive.
This method, however, presumes that each and every word/term in a dictionary is sensi-
tive. Take for instance the sentence: “Patient Name: Peter Smith”, from the anonymiza-
tion example in 1.1. By using a name dictionary on this sentence, the strings Peter and
Smith will match, and since names are directly identifiable information, these can be
annotated as sensitive. This method can be used to identify a number of sensitive infor-
mation categories. The following dictionary-types can be utilized by a de-identification
application, in order to perform a word/term-level sensitivity-classification.
• Person-names
• Geographic Locations
• Clinical Institutions Names
• Religions
• Zip codes
Various dictionaries and lexicons are typically fetched from publicly available resources,
which in turn are inexpensive and easily accessible. Not only sensitive dictionaries,
but also various other domain-relevant term-dictionaries are used to recognize the text
contents in clinical notes. Medical terminologies and classifications systems are often
built from various sources, at the cost of months or even years of work. Domain relevant
reference works are very often used in order to recognize medical terms, which do not
exist in general dictionaries. The following list shows frequently used reference works
in de-identification software, within the clinical domain.
• Medical Language Extraction and Encoding (MeDLEE): A natural language parser
used to recognize medical concept entities. It was originally designed for decision
support applications in the domain of chest X-ray reports, but showed high accu-
racy in extracting specific clinical information from discharge summaries, hence
the application of MeDLEE has expanded to different medical fields [31].
• Medical Subject Headings (MeSH):[32] is a controlled vocabulary and links medical
concepts and terms, and arranges these hierarchical. It is a twelve-level hierarchy,
consisting of 26853 descriptors or medical headings. MeSH is used for indexing/-
tagging articles from 5400 of the world’s leading biomedical journals, and further
used to perform search queries.
• SNOMED[24] is called a reference terminology and includes over 311000 unique
concepts. The terms are systematically organized and adapted for computer pro-
cessing, recognizing concepts and relationships from health data and further used
for aggregating the contents. It is used to index, store and retrieve clinical data
across specialties, and helps to organize the contents of medical records.
1Computational Complexity and Natural Language is another huge research field, among linguists
and cognitive scientists [30]
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• Unified Medical Language System (UMLS) [33] is a huge compendium of many
controlled vocabularies and provides a mapping between these. The UMLS i nte-
grates over 2 million names for some 900 000 concepts from more than 60 families
of biomedical vocabularies. The vocabularies are integrated as a thesaurus2, and
can be viewed as a big ontology3 of biomedical concepts, and is a powerful tool in
NLP and medical informatics. Among the many vocabularies it includes MeSH
and SNOMED, where terms from various vocabularies are connected through
concepts, which in turn are connected in relationships.
Dictionary lookups for sensitive words and medical terms is a common technique, but
also simplified and inconvenient, as words may have several meanings which again
requires contextual information from the belonging sentence.
Take for instence the sentence Hope Cushing has a fracture in the right elbow. Here, the
patients name is Hope Cushing, which will match against a name-dictionary. However,
the word right will also match in name-dictionary lookup, and hope is a verb which
isn’t sensitive and will also match against multiple dictionaries. Moreover, the word
Cushing will match in a medical dictionary as Cushing is a medical condition. Evidently,
word/term-level lookups can provide indications to the contents of a sentence, but will
in most cases be insufficient and require contextual analysis.
4.2.1.2 Regular Expressions
Regular expression is a pattern matching technique, and used to identify common pat-
terns which occur in texts. It is widely used in computer science areas like compilers
and text editors. One of the most advantageous property of regular expressions is the
ability to catch numerical patterns. Numerical patterns are frequently found in clinical
notes, and can be very sensitive. As certain types of information have a fixed nature and
predetermined structure, regular expressions can be used to recognize these. The fol-
lowing items are examples of information that occurs in clinical which can be recognized
by a regular expression.
• Dates
• National Identity Numbers
• ZIP codes
• Phone Numbers
• Medical Record Numbers
• Patient Numbers
• Bank Account Number
• Fax number
• Electronic Mail Addresses
2Reference work that lists words together according to similarity of meaning.
3Explicit formal specifications of terms in a domain and relations among them.
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• IP addresses
Every item on this list has a determined structure, in which neither the characters,nor
their positioning, can be random. For instance, Norwegian national identification num-
bers consists of 11 numbers, whereof; the first 6 digits represents the date of birth, the
next two are randomly fixed followed by a gender specific digit in which even numbers
are assigned to women and vice versa, and the final two digits representing a checksum,
validating the preceding numbers. However, regular expressions do not have the prop-
erty of validating checksums, as they only look at the charcaters and their positioning,
unable to perform further computation. Hence, in order to validate a Norwegian na-
tional identification number, a regular expression has to be used in combination with
a special rule that has the quality to confirm a checksum. In order to clarify how a
regular expressions works, table 4.1 provides an explicit example of a regular expression
used on Norwegian national identification numbers.
DDMMYY IIICC: (Day)(Month)(Year) (IdNumber)
Day: 0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01]
Month: 0[1-9]|1[012]
Year: [0-9][0-9]
IdNumber: [0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]
Table 4.1: Regular expression for national identification numbers
Regular expressions can also be used on phrase-level as well, but rarely used due to
complexity and unpredictability. Besides, this technique is also utilized to detect non-
numerical patterns. The de-identification application developed by Dele´ger et al.[34]
used regular expressions to match medication dosages. Another example is Neamatul-
lah et al.[1] who used regular expressions to recognize address patterns. Such regular
expressions often rely on dictionaries and special rules in order to increase the applica-
bility.
4.3 Machine Learning
Machine learning is a field within computer science and a branch of artificial intelligence.
The field is extensive and deals with a great number of today’s engineering challenges,
including NLP challenges. The main principle of machine learning systems is to learn
from data, without being explicitly programmed, but use experience to perform predic-
tions. Machine learning algorithms take data as input, with the purpose of identifying
underlying relationships and predict behavior.
One practical example is automated speech recognition; If the sound waves of 1000
people uttering the word yes are collected, and likewise for the word no, a machine
learning algorithm will use the sound waves as training data and establish a classifier
(binary classifier for this particular example). The classifier will be used to predict new
utterances as either the word yes or no by their sound waves and a likelihood which
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depends on the machine learning algorithm. A classifier’s robustness is often decided
by the level of variation in the training data[35].
4.3.1 Text Classification and Data Mining
Machine learning is a frequently used technique in the field of NLP. The range of use
is broad, but commonly used for text classification and information extraction.
Data mining or text mining (large scale data analysis) denotes the process of discovering
patterns in large data sets. Automated pattern discovery in texts is a hot topic at
the present time due to digitalization, and the ability to discover complex patterns
within large sets of data, beyond human reach. For example, data mining can help
companies to find customers with common interests, through the information stored
inside their customer databases. Data mining requires comprehensive quantity of data,
often fetched from databases and focuses on the discovery of unknown properties in the
data. Data mining approaches utilizes a variety of methods within different fields, i.e.
artificial intelligence, statistics and machine learning. The range of use is very broad as
it provides the ability to process raw data into useful information, and used in medicine,
business, games, engineering and visualization.
However, a detailed elaboration on data mining is outside the scope, but on the other
hand there is a reason for mentioning this topic. One highly appropriate example is
the use of data mining on medical records. The fact that medical records are converted
to digital format brings along a lot of possibilities, whereby data mining is one among
others. Data mining can have big impact on medical research, discovering complex
patterns by the means of clinical data. Muneo Khushima et al.[36] did an interesting
study, using data mining techniques to extract useful information from EMRs of chronic
hepatitis patients, which successfully identified patterns in the vocabularies. However,
the initial problem of privacy protection remains and prevents the fully exploitation
of data mining. Data mining requires large amounts of de-identified data, which is
too expensive to perform manually. Hence, this proves just another advantage of au-
tomatic or semi-automatic de-identification, making clinical information available for
such powerful tools.
4.3.2 Machine Learning and De-identification
Binary classifiers are primarily used in machine learning approaches as de-identification
is a binary classification problem. However, some approaches also choose to regard
de-identification as a multi-classification problem with the goal of classifying each
PHI(described in 2.10.1) category (Name, Date, Address, etc.). The state of the art
investigation shows that Support Vector Machine (SVM), Conditional Random Fields
(CRF) and Random Forests are commonly used machine learning methods.
The common property between such algorithms is to acquire knowledge and learn under-
lying relationship between features, and perform predictions. Machine learning features
are measurable properties of the data, which is analyzed in order to acquire distinctive
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characteristics. Some relevant machine learning features within NLP is: word length,
sentence length, word count, caption, POS-tags (see 4.3.3) and word-frequencies. The
learning is purely based on these features, which is why feature-selection is an actuat-
ing step and has huge impact on the end results. Robust machine learning models are
developed by testing different sets of feature-combinations on training data, whereby
the combination of features producing most optimal results are chosen.
One simplified example is a classifier trained and developed on newspapers. This clas-
sifier will probably achieve much better results when tested on newspapers than clinical
notes, as clinical notes often contains a lot of abbreviations, grammatical incorrect sen-
tences and a completely different vocabulary. This also illustrates the importance of
using relevant training data adjacent to the test set. Thus, feature selection and domain
relevance is crucial to the robustness of classifiers.
4.3.3 Part of Speech Tags
The process of marking a text in grammatical units is called POS-tagging, and plays an
important role in NLP. This is used to find relationship between words in a phrase, sen-
tence and paragraphs. A POS-tagger is a valuable part in text classification because the
order of these syntactic units can be used to reduce the possibility of misinterpretations,
and to resolve ambiguities.
One example is the sentence: heat water in a large vessel. A POS-tagger will assign a
POS tag to each word as following
Figure 4.1: POS-tag example[37]
But even POS-taggers are prone to error, as words can have several valid POS-tags.
These are either rule based or based on statistical techniques, including machine learning
methods such as SVM, Maximum entropy classifier and Nearest-neighbor. One of the
first and widely used English POS-taggers is rule based and called E. Brills tagger[38]
which achieved1 95% accuracy. It is challenging to obtain high accuracy rates as a word
maps to several POS-tags, and a tagger that makes predictions based on likelihood may
make wrong predictions. The next figure (4.2) illustrates the ambiguities which occurs
during the tagging of the abovementioned (4.1) sentence.
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Figure 4.2: POS-tag ambiguities[37]
This example shows that a POS-tagger has to make certain choices based on experience,
illustrating that relevant learning material is crucial.
A POS-tagger can be exploited by a de-identification application in several ways. By
converting words to their respective POS-tags, the resulting sequences of POS-tags can
be utilized as a feature by a machine learning classifier. POS-tags can be analyzed in
order to solve ambiguities in pattern matching approaches by exploring the surrounding
POS-tags. POS-tags are commonly used in machine learning-based systems. In Meystre
et al.’s[39] review about recent de-identification studies, six of the total eight studies
which uses machine learning used POS-tags as a features.
4.4 Evaluation Methods
De-identification software is commonly measured in terms of recall, precision, fall-
out and f-measure. These terms stems from Information Retrieval (IR), which is the
process of obtaining relevant information from a resource corpus, and the task of de-
identification can partially be conisdered as clinical information retrieval. As explained
in section 2.10.1, PHI refers to sensitive information, and the evaluation method clas-
sifies textual information as either PHI or non-PHI, without any intermediate grades.
The next sections will provide an introduction to each measure. The following ta-
ble( 4.2) defines central definitions used in binary classification. The following sections
are fetched from the preliminary study.
True Positive Correct classified PHI
True Negative Correct classified non-PHI
False Positive Incorrect classified PHI
False Negative Incorrect classified non-PHI
Table 4.2: Definitions used in binary classification tests
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4.4.1 Recall
Recall is the proportion of correct labeled PHI elements among the total amount of
PHI elements in the text, and is given by the following equation:
Recall =
TruePositives
TruePositives+ FalseNegatives
Recall is also called sensitivity in binary classification functions in the field of statistics.
The recall value itself is a weak indicator because it only provides information about
correct chosen PHI elements by the de-identifier and excludes the mistakes. In other
words, a de-identifier can label every single word of a text as PHI, and gain a perfect
recall rate of 100%, which is useless in practice as every word is removed from the text.
It proves more useful combined with precision and fallout rate.
4.4.2 Precision
Precision is the proportion of correct labeled PHI elements among the total amount of
labeled PHI elements. Precision is given by:
TruePositives
TruePositives+ FalsePositives
Precision is equivalent to positive predicted value in binary classification. The precision
value of a de-identification tool gives a good indication of the performance. A good
precision rate implies that the de-identifier has a good accuracy of labeling words as
PHI, however it excludes the proportion of ignored PHI elements, which is vital in
the context of sensitivity. Thus, neither precision rate nor recall rate provides optimal
measures separately. The combination of these is (f-measure 4.4.4) much better and
says a lot more about quality of the de-identification tool.
4.4.3 Fallout
Fallout is the proportion of incorrectly labeled PHI elements among the total amount
of non-PHI elements. Fallout is therefore given by the equation:
FalsePositives
TrueNegatives+ FalsePositives
This rate can be interpreted as the opposite of recall, as recall gives the rate of correct
labeling out of total possible amount of correct labeling. Fallout gives an indication
on the degree of incorrect labeling, ergo the amount of incorrect labeling out of the
maximum possible amount of incorrect labels (non-PHI). The purpose is generally to
achieve a low fallout rate as possible. However, in the context of de-identification of
sensitive texts, high fallout rate is not as fatal as low recall rate. High fallout rate only
indicates over-scrubbing 4. This will of course produce less specific output, but high
recall is prioritized against low fallout.
4Removal of too much data, i.e. insensitive data
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4.4.4 F-measure
Average of the precision and recall, where the best possible score is 1 and worst 0.
F-measure is calculated as:
Fβ =
(1 + β2)×Recall × Precision
Recall + (β2 × Precision)
Mathematically, this is the harmonic mean between recall and precision. This rate
provides a holistic evaluation of the system and is commonly used in de-identification.
Further in this report, we will use the traditional f-measure (F1-score) with β = 1.
4.4.5 Summary Example
To wrap up the terms described in previous sections and relate them to de-identification,
this section provides a short example. The example was also been used in the prelimi-
nary study.
Let us assume that we have an EHR containing a total of 30 words. The 30 words
consists of 13 PHI tokens, and 17 non-PHI tokens.
30 words
13 PHI
17 non-PHI
Table 4.3: EHR Example
Further, this EHR(4.3) has assumedly been de-identified by a de-identification appli-
cation. The output of the de-identification process shows that 15 words have been
classified as PHI, and 15 words as non-PHI. Comparing the application-output to the
”gold standard”, it shows that the 15 words classified as PHI consists of 5 non-PHI and
10 PHI words, meaning that 5 words have been over-scrubbed. By using this piece of
information, we can derive the results shown in the tables below (4.4 & 4.5):
Output Correct Incorrect
PHI 10 5
non-PHI 12 3
Table 4.4: De-identification output
True positives 10
False positives 5
True negatives 12
False negatives 3
Table 4.5: De-identification results
Finally, the recall, precision, fallout and f-measure can be computed as follows:
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Recall = 10
10+3
=⇒ 10
13
≈ 0.77
Precision = 10
10+5
=⇒ 10
15
≈ 0.67
Fallout = 5
5+12
=⇒ 10
17
≈ 0.29
F1Score=
(1+12)×0.77×0.67
0.77+(12×0.67) =⇒ 1.03181.44 ≈ 0.72
This is a very simple and specific example, at the same time as it describes how each
rate is related to de-identification.
4.5 Pattern Matching Approaches
The following section provides a selection of existing de-identification approaches based
on pattern matching. The pattern matching and machine learning approaches presented
in the following sections were also a part of our preliminary study, however some of these
have been slightly modified.
4.5.1 Gupta
One of the recent well-known de-identification systems is de-id, developed by Gupta et
al.[40]. De-id was originally developed at Pittsburgh University, in connection with the
Integrated Advances Information Management Systems (IAIMS) program intended to
de-identify various kinds of clinical documents. However, the de-identification tool was
further improved and adapted to surgical pathology reports by Gupta and his team.
This system employs pattern matching, various dictionaries, and a set of complex rules.
Among other elements, the special rules extracts information from the report headers,
which often contains a lot of sensitive information, and use this to search similar text
further in the reports.
Sensitive information is replaced by pseudonyms, in order to increase the readability.
The team improved and optimized De-id in a continuously collaboration with domain
experts, through a tripartite evaluation process, whereof each evaluation consisted of
967, 1000 and 300 reports, respectively. Overall evaluation results were never published,
but they reported that the system was reliably and specifically removing safe-harbor
identifiers. Only the amount of overmaking and undermaking errors (i.e. false positives
and false negatives) were presented without any number of the total amount of PHIs,
however the presented numbers shows consistent improvement throughout the three
evaluations, and their application has later been used to de-identify more than 35000
pathology reports, where minor problems continuously are identified and fixed.
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4.5.2 Neamatullah
Neamatullah et al.[1] described an approach, similar to Gupta et al.[40] which also ex-
tracts information form the report headers. They developed a perl5-based de-identification
application, with a primary focus on discharge summaries and nursing notes. A cer-
tain level of modifiability was added gradually, in order to increase the applicability.
This is also a pure pattern matching approach, using regular expressions, lexical lookup
tables, dictionary lookups, and simple heuristics. Names and locations were recog-
nized by dictionaries, whereas regular expressions were used to catch numerical PHI-
categories(described in 2.10.1) and addresses. Furthermore, a string algorithm was used
to detect potentially misspelled patient names. The software package, including source
code and dictionaries, is freely available on the internet[41][42], so that its working can
be studied, customized and improved.
To evaluate the de-identification application, a randomly selected subset of 2434 nursing
notes were extracted from the Multiparameter Intelligent Monitoring in Intensive Care
(MIMIC) II database which is a database containing Intensive Care Unit (ICU) patient
data[43]. The following results were obtained:
F-Measure Recall Precision Fallout
0.845 0.967 0.750 0.002
Table 4.6: Evaluation results achieved by Neamatullah et al.’s de-identification appli-
cation
4.5.3 Pantazos
Pantazos et al.[44] performed a de-identification study on Danish EMRs, which also was
a first-time approach in this country. Like most others, their strategy was to extract
sensitive information from the headers, and exploit the acquaint information on the rest
of the body. However, their procedure was somewhat different. The team got access
to an EMR database containing 437164 medical records, whereby 9 of 11 tables in the
database contained structured data. Sensitive information was obtained from the struc-
tured part, and searched for in the remaining 3 tables of free text notes. Furthermore,
sensitive information was replaced by pseudonyms; hence the output EMRs belonged
to artificial persons, which was the goal in the first place.
A separate replacement algorithm was defined for each type of identifier, such as person
names were replaced by other names with specific frequencies. Beyond that, the appli-
cation was based on simple language analysis, special rules and dictionaries. The total
amount of 323122 records were de-identified with an acceptable degree of anonymity,
readability and correctness, achieving an F-measure of 0.984. The system was evalu-
ated on a smaller test set, consisting of 369 random medical free text records, achieving
following results:
5Practical Extraction and Reporting Language, a dynamic programming language
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F-Measure Recall Precision Fallout
0.957 0.995 0.923 x
Table 4.7: Evaluation results achieved by Pantazos et al.’s de-identification application
4.6 Machine Learning Approaches
The following section provides a selection of de-identification approaches based on ma-
chine learning.
4.6.1 Dalianis
There has been performed a de-identification attempt in Sweden by Dalianis et al.[45],
on the Swedish gold standard called the Stockholm EPR PHI corpus. This de-identification
approach was somewhat different as the purpose was to compare two state of the art
machine learning algorithms, with and without the actual words of the corpus, implying
that only word-features were used to localize sensitive information. 14 features were
used to represent a token (words and sentences), i.e. POS-tag, token-length, whether
initial letter is capital, token-lengths of two tokens before etc. The two machine learning
algorithms were CRF and random forests. The experiment used an off-the- shelf CRF
implementation, CRF++. CRF is a machine learning method for segmenting and la-
beling sequence data, and used for structured prediction. Random forests is a so-called
ensemble classifier which involves a set of classifiers, and combines their prediction to
make a decision. Random forest consists of several decision trees and outputs the most
repetitive one. The method is a combination between Breimans ”bagging”6 and ”random
selection of features”. CRF performed best in terms of recall and f-measure, but random
forest achieved better precision rate. Their initial goal was to compare the evaluation
results with and without (only word-features) the actual words, whereby they arrived at
the conclusion that the results indicated severe performance losses without the actual
words, hence the chosen features were not sufficient for the suggested approach to be
viable. The results of both methods are presented below:
Type F-Measure Recall Precision Fallout
CRF 0.76 0.71 0.85 x
Random forest 0.67 0.54 0.89 x
Table 4.8: Evaluation results achieved by Dalianis et al.’s de-identification application
4.6.2 Uzuner
Uzuner et al.[46] developed one of the better de-identification tools based on pure ma-
chine learning. SVM is used to map tokens to one or several PHI categories, also called
6A machine learning ensemble meta-algorithm to improve statistical classification and regression
models, in terms classification accuracy.
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multiclass classification. The system considers syntactical and orthographical properties
of each concerned token and surrounding tokens. Orthography is a term in linguistics
and concerns elements as word length, letters, punctuation marks and spelling. POS-
tags were used as syntactic features. A distinctive characteristic in this approach is
the usage of a link grammar parser. A Link Grammar Parser builds relations between
sequences of words in sentences and adapts it to the respective language. For example,
Norwegian and English are so called Subject Verb Object (SVO)-languages, thus a link
grammar parser builds relations between the words and maps the relation to the respec-
tive pattern. The benefit of this approach is the ability to parse partially malformed
sentences. The output of the link grammar parser is further used as a syntactical feature
in the SVM. The test-corpus was picked from the Informatics for Integrating Biology
and the Bedside (i2b2)-challenge7 which included 889 discharge summaries. The result
from the study are presented below:
F-Measure Recall Precision Fallout
0.98 0.98 0.99 x
Table 4.9: Evaluation results achieved by Uzuner et al.’s de-identification application
in order to increase the performance. The second sequence labeling toolkit is called
Lingpipe, where the named entity tagging feature was used. This tagger is based on
hidden Markov models which uses n-grams and text chunking. Their main focuses
was to observe how well these tools worked ”out of the box” and how much work was
needed for additional performance gains. The results also showed that both Carafe and
Lingpipe worked well out of the box, with minimal tailoring. In order to improve the
recall, a number of regular expressions and a bias parameter were added. The best
result was achieved by the Carafe-system with f-measure, precision and recall greater
than 96%.
4.7 Hybrid Approach
Some de-identification approaches employs both machine learning and pattern matching
techniques and combines this in various ways. The following section presents one so-
called hybrid approach.
4.7.1 Ferrandez
Ferrandez et al.[48] developed a de-identifier called Best of Breed (BoB), adapted to
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) clinical documents. Their main focus was to
utilize existing rule and machine learning based methods, and alleviate the need of large
annotated corpora. BoB mainly consists of two components, high sensitivity extraction
component and false positive filtering component. The former component prioritizes
7A NLP-competition of developing the best de-identification software, arranged in 2006 by Dr.
Ozlem Uzuner [47]
4.7. HYBRID APPROACH 47
patient confidentiality and focus to achieve high recall, meaning that the threshold for
classifying a token as PHI is very low. Hence, this component contemplates too many
tokens as PHI, resulting in high recall - and low precision rate. They have used pattern
matching i.e. dictionaries, regular expressions, fuzzy search techniques and heuristics.
Additionally, machine learning was used in order to catch unusual PHI elements, where
a CRF classifier was used.
The second component was employed to mitigate the large amount of false positives
produced by the first component, hence the main focus is to find true positives among
already classified false positives. It is completely based on machine learning, and consists
of SVM classifiers. Firstly, they trained three SVM classifiers for names, numericals and
eponyms. Secondly, a linear multiclass classifier was used to detect all other types of
PHI. BoB was trained on 500 clinical documents and tested on 300. These included
consult notes as: nursing notes, discharge summaries, emergency room notes, progress
notes, preventive health notes, surgical pathology reports, psychiatry notes, history
notes, physical and other less common note types. Additionally, in order to test the
generalizability, they tested BoB on the i2b2 corpus from 2006. The following results
were achieved:
F-Measure Recall Precision Fallout
0.87 0.92 0.83 x
Table 4.10: Evaluation results achieved by the BoB-application on VHA clinical docu-
ments
F-Measure Recall Precision Fallout
0.89 0.92 0.87 x
Table 4.11: Evaluation results achieved by BoB-application on the i2b2-challenge corpus
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Part III
Implementation
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5
Introduction
There have been proposed several solutions to the problem of automatic de-identification
of free text clinical notes. The state of the art chapter(4) addresses two principal
methods, namely machine learning and pattern matching, which have shown promising
results in earlier experiments (described in 4.5 & 4.6). Unfortunatly, machine learning
approaches are dependent on adequate training data (4.3.2), which was unavailable.
However, we had access to various kinds of reference works which makes it possible
to develop a pattern matching approach. In addition to reference works, some simple
statistical methods were also included in order to assist the decision making and increase
the performance.
Our implementation is java-based. The team is familiar with the java platform, which
will facilitate time efficient development. Moreover, considered the wide range of meth-
ods and techniques used in de-identification, it might prove beneficial to organize the
proposed solution in an object oriented manner in order to ensure modifiability. Be-
sides, none clear reasons suggest that choosing another programming language would
constitute a significant advantage. Even though the implementation is java based, some
minor parts are implemented using python and c++.
The Application is implemented as a pipeline, and the design is inspired by Apache
cTakes [49]. The pipeline consists of 4 components; pre-processing, pattern matching,
classification and post-processing. Each of the components are implemented separately
and the information flows as illustrated in figure 5.1. Further sections will provide a
detailed description of each component.
Figure 5.1: Overview of the pipeline
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6
Preprocessor
The preprocessor transforms the raw text files and organizes them into a data structure
in order to facilitate for further processing. Hence, the need for a preprocessor is quite
apparent and is an important part of any NLP-application. The preprocessor reads each
document and transforms these into the following three structures; section, sentence and
token (illustrated in figure 6.1). Each section consists of multiple sentences and each
sentence consists of multiple tokens. A more detailed description of each structure
will be presented later. The performance of the system is greatly dependent on the
performance of the preprocessor, as its output forms the basis for further investigations;
an error at this stage will persist throughout the entire pipeline.
Figure 6.1: The main elements in the data structure
The preprocessor consists of several components which follows a pipeline structure.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the preprocessor pipeline. This section will firstly describe each
of the components and their functions, before presenting an overview of the finalized
data structure of each document, and further a discussion of drawbacks that affects the
system.
Figure 6.2: Overview of the preprocessor pipeline
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6.1 Cleaning
The first step of the application is to clean the input files by replacing problematic
characters that may cause problems later in the pipeline. As the raw files are UTF-
8-formatted (UTF-8 is an encoding that represents every unicode1 character), it is
convenient to standardize characters like whitespaces and line separators. One practi-
cal example is the cleaning of whitespace characters; Unicode defines several types of
whitespace characters, and since the whitespaces are used to split the text into tokens
(explained in 6.4) and sentences (explained in 6.2), it is beneficial if the whitespaces
remain consistent. It is for instance is easier to create robust regular expressions(7.2.1)
with standardized characters. The ”file-cleaner” simplifies these tasks by substituting
each type of whitespace character with the standard unicode space U+0020. A table of
unicode space characters has been added to the appendix, see figure C.1.
6.2 Sentence Splitting
The cleaned data is divided into sentences by a sentence-splitter, which is a slightly
modified off-the-shelf splitter provided by Apache Lucene [50]. The modifications were
made by fellow students working on other EviCare-projects (see 1.1.1), and adapted to
Norwegian texts.
The splitter identifies most of the sentences correctly, but struggles with malformed
sentences that lack either punctuation marks or whitespaces. Initially, the intention
was to improve the sentence splitter which may have lead improved performance , but
the time-limitation did not allow. Although this factor may affect as a source of error,
the contributions from the sentence analysis is less influential to final classification.
When the sentence-splitting is completed, the output is further used by the the POS-
tagger(6.3) and Tokenizer(6.4).
6.3 Part of Speech Tagging
Output from the sentence splitter is passed into a POS-tagger. The POS-tagger is
developed at Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) by Brox et
al.[51]. It is based on the theory of Hidden Markov Models [52], a machine learning
technique that assigns tags by likelihood. The tagger was evaluated on a Norwegian
corpus with 100,000 words by a 10-fold cross validation2, achieving an accuracy rate
of 95.04%. As POS-tags are important features for the classification of a token, the
performance of the POS-tagger is crucial in order to achieve good results. The output
produced by the POS-tagger is further used by the tokenizer.
1A digital standard representation of text, defining a mapping between characters and integer code
points representing them
2Divide data into 10 equal parts, train the classifier on 9 parts and test on the last part.
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6.4 Tokenizing
Clean sentences from the sentence splitter, together with POS-tagged sentences, are
passed into the tokenizer where they are divided into tokens. The tokenizer employs
the POS-tagged sentence files to assign a POS-tag attribute to each token, which is
used during the final classification. Tokens are split by whitespace characters, and since
the documents are cleaned, we only have to consider the standard unicode whitespace
character. Most usually, these tokens represent words, dates and numbers. A few
examples are presented below:
• 15/3-2011
• Word
• 68293050
The advantage of splitting tokens on whitespace characters is that patterns, such as
dates and phone numbers, often are preserved within the token. However, this only
includes tokens that are correctly spelled and follows a certain format, without any
whitespace characters. A common problem related to tokenizing is that one particular
and coherent piece of information is split into multiple pieces, because whitespace char-
acters occur in between the information. Such cases are not handled in the preprocessor,
which increases the complexity of the searches (thoroughly explained in section 7.2).
The reason for choosing this approach is to maintain a consistent preprocessor by not
making special rules during the splitting, and prevent unnecessary complications. Be-
sides, this is also more effective since such errors are handled together with the search,
which saves us from redundant checks. Table 6.1 illustrates some examples where the
preprocessor will create “problematic” output, which later needs to be handled during
searches:
Input Tokenized
120678 44587 (120678),(44587)
November 2012 (November), (2012)
68 29 30 50 (68),(29),(30),(50)
Table 6.1: Example of problematic output
Another drawback with the simple tokenization approach is that the preprocessor be-
comes vulnerable to misspellings or wrongful punctuation markings. A big part of the
approach is to look up tokens in reference works, such mistakes need to be handled
before proceeding with further investigations. For example, if two words are divided by
a comma without whitespace, the resulting token will consist of two words. Table 6.2
presents some examples:
Input Tokenized
”received medication.He is” (received),(medication.He),(is)
Day/evening/night (Day/evening/night)
Table 6.2: Example of problematic output
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Such behavior is handled inside the tokenizer, with a simple method that examines each
token and looks for sequences of alphabetical characters separated by special characters.
Further, the tokenizer creates a list of all the possible words existing within a token,
which are denoted as inntertokens. The list is created by splitting each token by every
special character (illustrated by example in table 6.3).
Input Tokenized Innertoken
medication.He medication.He (medication),(He)
Day/evening/night Day/evening/night (Day),(evening),(night)
15/3-2012 15/3-2012 (15),(3),(2012)
Table 6.3: Example of innertokens
As the table illustrates, the innertokens can contain sensitive information. A detailed
description how the innertokens are used, is described in section 6.5.1.
6.5 Data Structure
The data structure produced by the preprocessor forms the basis for rest of the pipeline.
One important clarification is that further on, the words “token” and “sentence” will be
written with italic3 font when we refer to object instances in our implementation.
The following section describe their most important attributed.
6.5.1 Token
Tokens are the smallest and most important units in our system. Tags are always
assigned on token-level, which makes the classification fully dependent on this informa-
tion. A token-instance has several attributes, whereby the most important are presented
in the following list:
OriginalToken: The token as it occurs in the text.
StrippedToken: A string where special characters occuring at the beginning or ending
of a OriginalToken is removed. The token, “-Date:”, will get Date as StrippedToken
. Strippedtoken is used to facilitate for dictionary lookups.
Innertokens: A list of possible words within a token, split by special characters. This
attribute is further explained in section 6.4.
POS-Tag: The part-of-speech tag assigned by the POS-tagger (6.3).
Stemmed Token The stem of the token (if it is a word), i.e. the word “diseases” has
the stem form “disease” and “increasing” has increase.
FinalTag: The final categorytag (explained in 7.1) of a token.
3This is italic font
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6.5.2 Sentence
A sentence consists of several tokens, and has some attributes which enables sentence-
level searching. The following list contains the most important attributes of a sentence-
instance:
OrginalSentence: The sentence as it occurs in the text.
StrippedSentence: A string composed of each tokens’s strippedtoken. This attribute
is used during the sentence-level tagging.
Phrases: Holds information of the phrases within the sentence. A phrase is a list
of tokens composed of token-level n-grams. Phrases can also be classified. For
instance, if the sentence contains an International Classification of Diseases (ICD)-
10 description, a phrase-object with the corresponding tokens and an ICD-10[53]
tag is added to the sentence.
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7
Pattern Matching
The pattern matching component is the main component of the application. The pre-
processed data is sent into this component as a document-object (as illustrated in fig-
ure 6.1), in which several types of analysis is performed, on both word- and phrase-level.
Our main strategy is to consider every token as sensitive, and accept one-by-one as
long as they meet certain criteria. The process is tag-based which means that tokens
and phrases are tagged by categories during the investigation. For instance, when a
token gets positive date-validation, it will be tagged as a date, and further be exam-
ined for other categories. Hence, tokens and phrases will be able to receive multiple
tags, whereby each tag has a Boolean1 value denoting either sensitive or insensitive.
When every token and phrase have been investigated and tagged, the document-object
passed into the postprocessor. But first, a detailed description of the pattern matching
component will be presented.
The pattern matching component can be further divided into two subcomponents based
on whether it uses tokens or sentences as input. Figure 7.1 illustrates the overall
structure of the pattern matching.
Figure 7.1: Overview of the pattern matching
1binary value: true or false
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7.1 Categorytag
As our approach is tag-based, the main technique is to assign classification tags to tokens
and phrases. The classification tags are implemented as independent data structures
called categorytags. A categorytag denotes a category, and is assigned to a token when
a token is classified. The categorytag has three attributes; tag, code and description.
• The tag attribute indicates the type of the categorytag, i.e. ICD10. It includes an
associated sensitivity-value, indicating the sensitivity of the tag; for instance if a
token is tagged as a name, the corresponding sensitivity value is true.
• The Code attribute enable medical codes to be associated with a tag. Currently,
only medical codes (described in section 7.2.3) use this feature.
• The Description attribute holds a textual description of the categorytag, mostly
used for medical codes.
7.2 Token-level Tagging
Token-level tagging is performed by three components: regular expression, dictionary
lookups and medical codes search. This is the performance-intensive part of the appli-
cation as each token is looked up in an extensive library of reference works. However,
a substantial drawback is that most of the token-level tagging is performed indepen-
dently, without any contextual considerations, which causes unreliable tagging and in
turn makes the system prone to wrong classification. When the token-level tagging
is completed, a final categorytag is classified. The final classification is a simplified
process, which is described in chapter 9. The sections below describe the three main
components of the token-level tagging. Figure 7.2 provides an overview of the token
matcher.
Figure 7.2: Overview of the token-level tagging
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7.2.1 Regular Expression Matching
Regular expressions are used to recognize sequences of characters with determined struc-
ture. Inspired by Neamatullah et al.[1], among others, the application use regular
expressions to recognize several patterns. The following list shows each category of
sensitive information recognized by regular expressions, whereby each has a belonging
categorytag.
• Date
• Mail Adress
• Website Url
• National Idenification Number
• Phone Number
• Bank Account Number
• Time (hour)
• Month
• Year
• Drivers License Number
• Car Registration Number
• Zip Code
Every category listed above has a true sensitivity-value, implying that the matching
tokens reveals sensitive information, and thus will be removed. At the same time,
the regular expression matcher is not limited to only accept sensitive categories, which
provides the possibility to extend the application with insensitive patterns as well.
As figure 7.3 illustrates, some of the regular expressions are assisted by checks to in-
crease the precision. These checks are necessary since regular expressions only recognize
patterns without any further possibilities to perform calculations (i.e. in order to val-
idate checksums). For instance, dates have a certain format, and the application use
regular expressions to match the format of a potential date, and then use additional
methods to ensure that the potential date is a valid date.
The regular expressions component is mainly dependent on tokens, but since the to-
kenizer (thoroughly explained in section 6.4) splits on whitespaces it is necessary to
analyze multiple tokens in case familiar patterns are split. Our workaround for this
problem is to use a pattern called part, which only match if a token may be a part of a
pattern across multiple tokens, and then match the pattern on these.
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Figure 7.3: Overview of the regular expression matching
7.2.2 Dictionary Lookup
The dictionary lookup is a simple dictionary search, where each of the dictionaries are
matched against each token’s lowercase form strippedtoken (see 6.5.1). The dictionary
database is indexed using Apache Lucene[50], which was chosen simply because it offers
appropriate functionalities for our purpose, making it fast to implement. Each dictio-
nary in the dictionary database has an associated categorytag, constraining a dictionary
to consist of only one type of words. Hence, if a token match against a person name dic-
tionary, the token will be tagged as a person name. An issue related to this approach is
that it is dependent on reference works of distinctive categories, such as: person-names,
street names, geographic locations, which simplifies the process of classification. When
it comes to more general dictionaries, as norkompleks ([54]) and ordnett ([55]), it is
difficult to decide a sensitivity value. Such dictionaries include most of the Norwegian
words which makes it challenging to assign a categorytag.
It is straightforward to add new dictionaries, which is a big advantage, providing high
modifiability. Figure 7.4 illustrates overall structure of the dictionary search.
Figure 7.4: Overview of the dictionary lookup component
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Dictionary lookup is an essential part in most pattern matching approaches (4.2.1). This
is also the case in our implementation through which the majority of the tokens are
assigned (several) categorytags. The following list shows all the token types supported
in the dictionary database.
• Dosage unit
• Person Name
• Medicament
• Element
• Nationality
• Organization number
• Place name
• Weekday
• Numeral
• Physicians’ Desk Reference (Felleskatalogen[56])
7.2.3 Medical Codes Search
Medical notes often contain standard medical terminologies from medical vocabularies
and medical classification systems. medical vocabularies are system of disease names
with explanation of their meaning, whereas medical classification systems is descriptions
of medical diagnoses and procedures into universal medical code numbers. These terms
are important to recognize as they constitute the medical contents of the notes, which
in turn is alpha and omega to researchers. However, some diseases are ”critical” to keep
inside a de-identified clinical note as they may be rare and apparent, thus indirectly
identifiable (described in 2.4.2). Our initial plan was to use a statistical overview of
disease-occurrence, and use this to discard rare diseases. Unfortunately, this was never
implemented because of late access to statistics, but the application is able to recognize
several codes, making it ready for such an extension. Below follows a list of all the
supported codes.
• Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification System (ATC) [57]
• International Classification of Diseases Version 2010 (ICD-10) [53]
• International Classification of Primary Care Version 2 (ICPC-2) [58]
• Medical Subject Headings (MeSH)[32]
• Norwegian Classification of Medical Procedures (NCMP) [59]
• Norwegian Classification of Radiological Procedures (NCRP) [60]
• The NOMESCO Classification of Surgical Procedures (NCSP) [61]
• Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine Clinical Terms (SNOMED CT) [24]
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In the same manner as dictionary lookup, each token is looked up inside the medi-
cal terminologies and classification systems, and gets the corresponding tag when it
matches. The information about the medical terms is stored inside the code and de-
scription attribute of the tag. Figure 7.5 illustrates the searching procedure of a input
token containing a Norwegian Classification of Medical Procedures (NCMP) code.
Figure 7.5: Example medical codes search
7.3 Sentence-level Tagging
When the token-level tagging is accomplished, the input text is further investigated and
tagged on a sentence-level. This is partially performed through dictionary matching,
and partially through the tags that already exists within each token. Sentence-level
analysis is beneficial in order to fully exploit dictionaries that contains expressions and
phrases consisting of several tokens. As referred to earlier, the token-level tagging
is performed independently and makes the judgment unreliable, which places a huge
limitation on the decision making phase.
Sensitive information is often composed of several tokens with several meanings which
the token-level tagging may ignore:
• Grensen skole (Grensen school)
• A˚s kommune Oppvekst og Kultur (A company in A˚s municipality)
• Legevakten i Klepp (The accident and emergency unit in Klepp)
These examples show the importance of considering multiple tokens which also might
provide indications about the context thereby a sentence-level tagging component is
included in the implementation design.
There are a lot of ways to use the sentences from the input text to search in the
dictionaries. A simple approach is to look for exact matches in the dictionaries and
obtain highly reliable tags. However, this also requires that the dictionary descriptions
must be equivalent to the search-phrases, which can be impeded by misspellings, the
lack of words or different order of words. In order to regard such factors, the sentence-
level tagger is composed by three components: Phrase-search, N-gram search and dose-
matcher. When a phrase is matched by one of these components, the matched phrase
and information about the respective dictionary is added to the sentence-object as a
phrase-object. Mistakes made by sentence splitter(6.2) may have an impact in this
process as the output is used to perform sentence-level tagging. Figure 7.6 illustrates
the overall structure of the sentence-level tagging.
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Figure 7.6: Overview of the sentence-level tagging
7.3.1 Phrase Search
The phrase-search component is used to recognize full sentences and phrases com-
posed of more than 3 tokens (since n-gram is restricted to a maximum of three tokens,
see 7.3.2). The search phrases are looked up in the dictionary database, which in-
cludes medical dictionaries and classification systems (ICD-10[53], MeSH[32], Anatomi-
cal Therapeutic Chemical Classification System (ATC)[57], etc.) together with sensitive
dictionaries (Place names, clinical firm names, etc.) In the same manner as the token-
level tagging, each dictionary has a belonging tag. The following list presents the types
of phrases currently supported by this search:
• The NOMESCO Classification of Surgical Procedures (NCSP)
• ICD-10
• International Classification of Primary Care (ICPC)-2
• SNOMED
• NCMP
• Norwegian Classification of Radiological Procedures (NCRP)
• Organization Names
Phrase search in the abovementioned dictionaries enables the possibility to recognize
medical diagnoses and procedures from classification systems without the corresponding
code present. When a description is matched against a search-phrase, the correspond-
ing code is looked up, after which a phrase-object is instantiated and assigned to the
sentence. Even though the majority of the list-items are medical classification systems
which includes a code and a description, the search works on plain dictionaries as well,
such as organizational names.
Each sentence is compared to the phrases in the phrase dictionaries using SimString[62]
with the cosine similarity as similarity measure. To determine the similarity between
the search-phrase and the dictionary contents, the cosine similarity score is compared
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with a self-tuned threshold, whereby a match is denoted when the score exceeds the
threshold. Cosine similarity is widely used in the field of IR[63].
The cosine similarity uses word-frequencies to vectorize both the search-phrase and
dictionary-phrases, and computes a score based on the cosine angle between these vec-
tors. The score is negative correlated with the angle, hence the score increases when
the angle decreases. Another property of this technique is that score is computed inde-
pendently of the word ordering, which is exactly why we employ this method; in order
to recognize medical contents and sensitive information in a wider range than exact
match.
Cosine similarity is defined the following equation:
Similarity =
~S · ~P
‖~S‖‖~P‖
Where S is the sentence vector and P is the phrase vector.
The vectors are based on the Bag of Words (BoW)-model. Here follows a simple exam-
ple:
Phrase: Congenital heart block
Sentence: The patient has congenital heart block
Word Sentence Phrase
block 1 1
congenital 1 1
has 1 0
heart 1 1
patient 1 0
the 1 0
Table 7.1: The number of occurrences of each word
~S = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]
~P = [1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]
Similarity =
~S · ~P
‖~S‖‖~P‖ =
3√
3
√
6
≈ 0, 71
The similarity is then compared to the decided threshold.
When the phrase achieves a score which exceeds the similarity thresholds, it is further
investigated. This is necessary because the cosine similarity threshold needs to be low
in order to find potential phrases, resulting in a lot of incorrect matches. Hence, the
cosine similarity is only used as a filter to weed out the most similar phrases from the
dictionaries. Simstring has proven to be fast and efficient [62], which is an advantage as
the application makes use of several huge dictionaries. Even though we have disregarded
high time efficiency as a requirement to the application, it is a convenient and time-
saving method which serves the purpose of phrase searching in an effective manner.
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Depending on the threshold, the search will find several potential phrases within a
sentence, whereby lower thresholds give higher hit-rates. As initially mentioned, the
threshold will be fine-tuned as a part of the experiment since the threshold may influence
the overall performance.
The most similar phrases from the dictionaries filtered out by the cosine similarity
component are further investigated, one by one, by means of three techniques:
Levenshtein distance: The phrase is compared to the input-sentence by token-level
overlapping, in which a Levenshtein distance (edit distance) on each token is
allowed. Levenshtein distance is used in a wide range of applications like text
string matching, character recognition, spell checking, fuzzy search and record
linkage (2.10.2). The Levenshtein distance between two sequences of texts denotes
the number of edits/primitive operations required to change one textual sequence
into the other. The primitive operations are insertion, deletion and substitution.
The application use equal weighting for these operations whereof each cost-value
is set to one. Here follows some example to illustrate the method, in which the
function λ(α, β) denotes the Levenshtein distance between text sequences α and
β, or the cost of transforming α into β:
• λ(”cool”, ”fool”) = 1, (substitution of ”c” for ”f”)
• λ(”De − identification”, ”identification”) = 3, (deletion of ”D”, ”e” and
”-”)
• λ(”prove”, ”improvement”) = 6, (insertion of ”i”, ”m”, ”m”, ”e”, ”n”, ”t”)
This is a convenient way to account for potentially misspelled words. Clinical
notes may contain several misspellings, Ruch et al.[64] reported error-rates up
to 10%, whereby follow-up notes are most vulnerable. The application has an
adjustable edit-distance per token in a phrase, and different edit-distances will
be tested during the experiment. However, the distance is not normalized with
respect to token-length which might be a drawback since longer tokens may involve
a higher amount of misspellings. One proposed solution is to use a dynamic
Levenshtein distance, which has shown to give better results [65].
Comparator: The phrase is compared to the input-sentence by a token-level inter-
section, in which it is performed a count of common words independent of word
ordering. This method provides the ability to recognize sentences with similar
meanings and dissimilar structure. Take for instance this input-sentence from
a clinical note: Abnormalities on hair shaft and hair color after chemo therapy.
This sentence consists of every word present in the ICD-code L67 : Hair color
and hair shaft abnormalities. Hence, when a phrase from a medical classification
system or sensitive dictionaries exists within the input-sentence, the matching
tokens in the sentence are tagged with corresponding tag. In this example, the
tokens hair, color, and, hair, shaft, abnormalities are tagged ICD. The drawback
is that every word has to exist within the dictionary-phrases, which is a rather
poor implementation, since redundancies such as stop words prevents the fully
exploitation of the comparator. It would be sensible to remove stop words from
both parts in order to obtain better effect.
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Exact matching: Compares the phrase to the sentence by comparing if the phrase
exactly overlaps some parts of the sentence. Misspellings are not accepted by
using this technique, which is an obvious drawback when recognizing phrases in
record notes.
The following figure illustrates how the potentially matching phrases are processed:
Figure 7.7: Overview of the phrase search
7.3.2 N-Gram Search
The second component of the sentence-level tagging is the n-gram search. A token-level
n-gram denotes the processes of composing a phrase from n consecutive tokens. Hence,
n consecutive tokens are fetched from the sentences, and their compositions are further
used to search in reference works. Our application uses bigram (n=2) and trigrams
(n=3). Here follows a short example of a bigram and trigram:
Sentence: This is a short sentence
Tri-gram:
This is a
is a short
a short sentence
Bi-grams:
This is
is a
a short
short sentence
N is limited to a maximum of three tokens because the phrase-search handles longer
sequences, and is likely to match if a consecutive sequence of four or more tokens exists
in both the search phrase and reference work. N-grams is a frequently used technique
in the field of computational linguistics, and is also utilized in several de-identification
applications on either character-level or word-level ([66],[67],[46])
The component is implemented in a similar manner as the dictionary lookup (de-
scribed 7.2.2) with Apache Lucene[50] indexed dictionaries, whereby exact match is
required for tagging. When a n-gram phrase finds a match in a reference work, the
n-gram is assigned to the sentence as a phrase-object for use during the classification.
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7.3.3 Dosage Matching
Medicament dosages are common parts of clinical notes and thus has to be recognized by
the application. Dosage descriptions are recognized by regular expressions and dictio-
nary lookups, an approach inspired by Dele´ger et al.[34]. Dosage descriptions includes
whitespaces and has to be matched on a sentence-level, due to the problems discussed
in section 6.4).
Unfortunately, the lack of robustness resulted in an unsatisfactory dose matcher which
tags too many tokens. One recurring problem was that dates were mistaken for doses by
the regular expression, which we never managed to improve. As a quick fix, the dosage
matcher was assigned least priority and applied on tokens which were unrecognized by
other components. However, the performance will not be crucially affected in terms of
recall, as dosages are considered as insensitive information.
Dosage descriptions often include dosage units and medicaments which are tagged by the
dictionary lookup component. Medicaments are looked up in the pharmaceutical cod-
ing system ATC[57], which is an international drug classification. In order to combine
regular expressions with the dictionary lookup, we have made another simplification;
If two tokens within a sentence is tagged as either dose, dose unit or medicament, a
phrase-object is instantiated consisting of the tokens in between. This phrase-object is
tagged as a medicament phrase. By experience we observed that tokens which occurs
between dosages and medicaments usually involve information related to the medica-
ments, hence through this technique the application will potentially be able to recognize
more dose/medicament patterns. Below follows an example of a medicament phrase
added to a sentence. Green tokens denotes matched medicaments, doses or dose units,
whereas blue tokens becomes part of the medicament phrases.
Medicaments: Sodium chloride 1x1 in each eye, glycerol 1x1 in left eye, Fragmin 5000
lE
7.4 Handling Unmatched Tokens
So far, we have presented the main pattern matching components and the appurtenant
search techniques. However, even though the initial search is accomplished, there might
still be several untagged tokens. The classification-component will classify each un-
tagged word as sensitive which will not harm the recall, but on the other hand nega-
tively affect the precision and fallout. Hence, in order to somewhat reduce this negative
effect, the untagged tokens are re-processed by means of two techniques, stemming and
innertokens.
7.4.1 Stemming
Stemming is the process of reducing inflected words to their stem. For instance the
word chairs has the stem chair, and the words connected, connective and connection
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have the stem connect. Stemming algorithms are used in a lot of IR applications, also
within the medical domain[68], and have shown to increase the retrieval accuracy[69].
Our application makes use of a simplified and self-defined stemming method. It is
implemented by using a computational lexicon of Norwegian words called Norkompleks.
Norkompleks contains stem words, their POS, inflected words and word-senses. Each
untagged token and its’ belonging POS-tag is searched looked up among the stemmed
words of Norkompleks. The POS-tag is used to disambiguate between different word-
senses, which in turn makes the stemming heavily dependent on the accuracy of the
POS-tagger, which is an obvious drawback. A potentially better approach could have
been to only use POS-tags on words with different word-senses. Unfortunately, this
approach only reflects our hindsight and thus it was never tried. Figure 7.8 presents a
small example of the stemming procedure. If the stemming is successful, the token is
processed once more using the token stem as input, in case the stemmed token exist in
some of the initial dictionaries.
Figure 7.8: Stemming of the word ”Kjegler” (English: Cones)
7.4.2 Innertokens
Unmatched tokens which have innertokens (discussed in 6.5.1) are processed once more.
Each innertoken is processed as a normal token, but their resulting tags are added to the
original token. Hence, if the original token is Wednesday/Thursday, the inntertokens
”Wednesday” and ”Thursday” will by looked up in a dictionary and classified.
Wrongful punctuation will cause problems for this method, for instance for tokens as
”Olsen.The”. This token is split into two inntertokens, ”Olsen”and ”The”. Further, when
”Olsen” successfully matches against a name dictionary, the original token ”Olsen.The”
will be tagged as sensitive. This is a partially wrong decision as ”The” not is sensitive,
however, it is better to be on the safe side. Hence, when a token has at least one sensitive
inntertoken, the remaining inntertokens will be wrongfully tagged as sensitive. This is
again a choice of preferring recall above precision.
8
Statistical
This section will briefly describe the technique of weighting text units in automated text
analysis, and further explain how the application makes use of Inverse Document Fre-
quency (IDF) to weight tokens and sentences.
8.1 Weighting
Term weighting is a common technique used in computational linguistics, such as IR and
data mining (described in 4.3.1). A weight is assigned to each term in a document or
corpus, which often depends on the number of occurrences of the term in the document.
Hence, we would like to compute a score (weight) ω(τ, δ) of term τ in corpus δ.
There exist several different term weighting methods, whereby IDF is one of the most
widely used for estimating the term sensitivity in a corpus. Other commonly used
techniques are Residual Inverse Document Frequency (RIDF), Information Gain (IG)
and chi square [70]. Term frequency weighting has proven to be effective for filtering stop
words (frequent words as“the”, “is”and“a”). For our purpose, term frequency is a cheap
way to allow frequently occurring terms in the health record notes, as these presumably
are insensitive. Nevertheless, the readability will be maintained by allowing frequent
and common words. Infrequent terms in clinical notes indicates unique information,
which might denote rare medical conditions or other kinds of peculiarities that can
be used to identify the concerned patient. Hence, we chose to implement a statistical
component based on term frequency.
8.2 Inverse Document Frequency
We have implemented a frequency module based on the term weighting technique IDF,
with following assumption; terms present in a small subset of the corpus have higher
probability of being directly identifying, in contrast to terms which are present in al-
most every document. Hence, the application makes the use of a lower and an upper
threshold which is compared to each term’s IDF-score, whereby high IDF-score denotes
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infrequent and rare terms, and vice versa. Our assumption is that insensitive infor-
mation occurs more often than sensitive information, implying higher IDF-scores for
sensitive information. However, this assumption might be on unsound basis since a
corpus can contain repetitive sensitive information. Such information can be hospital
or ward names, and also other kinds of repetitive identifiers occurring in the head-
ers. The followings sections will present all the implemented statistical features in the
application, which also is illustrated in figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: Overview of the statistical implementation
8.2.1 Formula
The inverse document frequency is expressed by the formula [71]:
idft = log10
N
dft
Where:
N denotes the number of documents in the corpus.
dft denotes document frequency (amount of documents containing the term).
The formula has the following implications: The IDF-score of a rare term is high and
the IDF-score of a common term is low. Hence, a text corpus consisting of 100,000
notes whereof 75,000 contains the word ”and” and 6 contains the date ”19.01.1967”, will
give the following IDF-scores:
idfand = log10
100, 000
75, 000
= 0.125
idf19.01.1967 = log10
100, 000
6
= 4.22
An important note regarding the thresholds we use is that these are corpus-specific and
tuned with respect to the IDF-score of each term, which in turn is measured by the
corpus size. Hence, if a corpus containing 50,000 notes is extended and doubled into
100,000 notes, the thresholds have to be re-tuned accordingly. This will probably have
bigger influence on terms with high IDF-scores (rare terms), since the extension most
likely will include instances of the common words.
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For instance, if the above-mentioned text corpus is extended to 200,000 notes, the date
”19.01.1967” will get following IDF-score if it still occurs 6 times:
idf19.01.1967 = log10
200, 000
6
= 4.52
The IDF-score increases from 4.22 to 4.52, hence the idf-thresholds should not be fixed
to an application should be re-tuned according to the corpus-changes.
8.2.2 Supported Features
The application has several features based on the IDF function, this section will describe
the implemented features.
The IDF-function is used on both, sentences-level and token-level. Hence, when the
application is executed, the IDF-score is computed for each sentence and token, and
further stored in two databases. These are embedded in order utilize the IDF-scores of
the entire corpus.
We use three different thresholds:
Threshold on token-level, where all tokens below the threshold α is considered to be
insensitive. This is intended to recognize frequent words and terms, like stop
words, in order to increase readability. As discussed, there is a potential risk that
repetitive sensitive information achieves IDF-score below.
Threshold on token-level, where all tokens above the threshold β is considered to
be sensitive. As assumed, sensitive information occurs less common and hence
achieves high IDF-score.
Threshold on sentence-level where all sentence below the threshold γ is considered to
be insensitive. This is to allow common sentences, which can prove beneficial by
including sentences with untagged tokens. However, it is unlikely that sentences
are equivalent except for document specific headings.
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9
Classification
The third part of the pipeline is the classification part, in which the tokens and sentences
are assigned one of two final tags, namely sensitive or insensitive.
9.1 Classification Algorithm
The classification procedure is carried out through a simple classification algorithm, in
which the steps are prioritized by the assumed robustness of the searching techniques.
The algorithm is described below:
1. Tokens with certain POS-tags are marked as insensitive.
The first step of the algorithm is to filter tokens by their corresponding POS-tags,
in which following POS-tags are considered as insensitive:
• Preposition
• Conjunction
• Pronoun
• Subordinating conjunction
• Determinative
• Interjection
• Infinitive marker
The tokens which belongs to these POS-tags are assumed to be insensitive. It
is still a risky simplification since these tokens may reveal indirectly identifiable
information, such as gender (pronouns). However, we have chosen to classify
gender as insensitive, despite the fact that gender might be used to identify a
person (discussed in 2.10.2) .
2. Every token within a tagged phrase in each sentence are assigned the
categorytag and sensitivity value belonging to the phrase.
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During the sentence-level tagging, the sentences may have been tagged with sev-
eral phrase-objects. Our assumption is that a match in the sentence-level tagging
is more robust since several tokens have to match against the dictionaries, thus the
sentence-level tagging is dedicated high priority. Hence, every token involved in
the matchedphrase-objects is assigned the respective categorytag and sensitivity-
tag.
3. Each sentence’s IDF-score is compared against the pre-defined sen-
tence-IDF-threshold, whereby each token in a sentence falling below
the threshold is classified as insensitive.
Frequently occurring sentences are assumedly insensitive, thus the belonging to-
kens are classified as insensitive.
4. For each unclassified token, the potential tags are examined using sim-
ple rules and heuristics, before a final classification is made.
Each token is investigated through different checks, and a final classification is
made if there is a match. The investigation proceeds as follows:
(a) If the token has one tag, choose this tag.
(b) If the token only contains the tags YEAR and ZIPCODE, the preceding
token is investigated. If the preceding token is “i” (“in”), the token is set to
YEAR.
(c) If the token only contains the tags NAME and GEOGRAPHICLOCA-
TION, one of these tags are assigned as finaltag (randomly).
(d) If the token contains NAME or GEOGRAPHICLOCATION, the POS-
tag of the token is investigated. If the POS-tag is NOUN PROP, choose
the NAME or GEOGRAPHICLOCATION as final tag (if only one ex-
ists, assign this), else remove NAME and GEOGRAPHICLOCATION
from the tags.
(e) If no other rule has been matched; choose a random tag.
This step is hugely simplified and a great deal of checks could have been added.
It is not to conceal that the classification part could have been carried out better,
which did not happen due to time constraints. The intention was to enrich this
“rule base” continuously along the development.
Rule (b) is implemented because zip codes and years have similar patterns (Norwe-
gian zip codes consist of 4 digits), which may cause some tokens to be tagged with
both. This happens in spite of the regular expression validation which happens on
both categories; a token is only tagged as YEAR if it is between 1900-2140, and
ZIPCODE if it exists in the dictionary containing Norwegian zip codes. Hence,
every number between 1900-2140 which also has a zip code will be tagged as both
YEAR and ZIPCODE. However, both categories are sensitive; hence wrong
classification won’t have any impact on the performance.
Rule (c) is implemented simply because there is no need for distinguishing between
NAMES and GEOGRAPHICLOCATION, as both is directly identifying.
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Rule (d) is needed because the name- and geographic location dictionaries are huge
and extensive, hence common insensitive Norwegian words often matches against
these, causing ambiguities. The workaround is to only consider the tokens with
NOUN PROP as POS-tag ,in order to limit the amount of ambiguous tokens.
Ideally, this assumption is always correct, however only with a POS-tagger with
perfect precision.
Rule (e) is far from the optimal solution, but as mentioned, the time constraint did
not allow a richer rule base; hence random classifications are made if no other rule
is applied. The performance is not influenced when all the potential categorytags
have equal sensitivity, but when this not is the case a certain a good dose of luck
is needed. Hence, a potential for performance improvement is to enrich the rule
base and prevent random classifications.
5. For each token without any tag, the token’s idf -score is compared to
lower - and upper IDF-threshold, where each token below the lower
threshold is set to insensitive and each token above the upper thresh-
old is set to sensitive.
Frequently occurring tokens are assumedly insensitive and thus classified as insen-
sitive. Rare tokens are assumedly sensitive and thus classified as sensitive. This
step has less impact on the performance as such tokens without any potential tags
regardless are classified as sensitive in step 7.
6. For each token without any tag, the token is stemmed, whereby a
successful stemming is followed by a jump to step 4 with the stem
token as input.
7. Each token without any tag is classified as sensitive. To be in the safe
side, the only choice is to remove such unknown tokens.
8. The proportion of sensitive tokens are calculated in each sentence. The
percentage is compared to a threshold; if the percentage of sensitive
tokens is above this threshold, each token in the sentence is classified as
sensitive. The threshold is further denoted as SSP (sensitive sentence
proportion)
9.2 Classification Summary
The classification algorithm is hugely simplified. Especially step 4 needs an improve-
ment, since the rules don’t fully exploit the available information. Besides, using a
random classifier is a huge drawback as it causes unreliable results. Information clas-
sification is an important phase of a de-identification application and the simplified
algorithm will undoubtedly weaken the performance. Unfortunately, we were unable to
test different classification methods due to time constraints. The classification process
is, however, independently implemented; hence, the rule base can easily be extended.
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10
Postprocessor
The postprocessor regenerates the clinical documents, in which the sensitive information
is replaced by respective finaltags, as illustrated in figure 10.1. A somewhat drawback
by replacing the sensitive information with specific tags is that some of these tags might
be wrong, which results in misleading output. However, this can be regarded as a trifle
as it won’t affect the performance.
The original files are read and compared to each token in our system, in order to
regenerate identical documents, whereby the sentences, paragraphs and overall structure
is maintained.
The postprocessor is modifiable, which makes it easy to add support for pseudonyms.
Unfortunately, pseudonymous information relies on precise tagging; hence, a better
classification algorithm needs to be implemented before the application can produce
pseudonymous output.
Figure 10.1: Example output
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Part IV
Results
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Experiment Preparations
The experiment was conducted on a net-disconnected server inside a separate lab de-
scribed in section 1.2.5. The performance evaluation was carried out by comparing the
de-identified output against a manually annotated reference standard.
11.1 Reference Standard
This section describes the manual annotation process.
11.1.1 Note Types
The reference standard used to evaluate the de-identification application was annotated
manually in the laboratory. A total selection of 225 clinical notes from the Norwegian
EHR-corpus was manually de-identified, whereby the notes consisted of 75 discharge
summaries, 75 nursing notes and 75 record notes. The intention was to annotate a
higher amount of documents (at least 150 of each type) in order to achieve reliable
results, however the time constraint did not allow.
Discharge summaries are clinical reports written by different kinds of health profession-
als, for each patient who is discharged from a hospital. Discharge summaries contain
discharge diagnosis, operations, laboratory, x-rays, hospital course and various other
hospital related documentation. The reason for including discharge summaries in the
reference standard is due to text richness. Another factor is that these often involve a
lot of background information about the patient, which increases the de-identification
challenge.
Nursing notes are documents created by nurses or other health care professionals. In
almost all hospitals, nurses write notes about their patients on a daily basis. These
include summaries of accomplished daily routines like medication, issues, diagnosis and
further notes about the medical plan. Nursing notes are often short, in contrast to
discharge summaries. The Subjective Objective Assessment Plan (SOAP)-procedure is
often used to record the patient interaction [72]:
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Subjective: What the patient has to say.
Objective: What the health care professional observes.
Assessment: Quick summary of symptoms, diagnosis and overall progress.
Plan: The plan for the treatment.
Such notes often contains non-standard medical language, which makes them different
from discharge summaries[1]. Hence, it can be interesting to observe how the perfor-
mance is influenced by the different note types.
The last type is called record-notes (Norwegian: “Journalnotater”). These are recorded
by different health professionals, and contain quick status checks, or supplementary
documentation to ongoing treatments. Nursing notes is one example of record notes,
but our set does not contain nursing notes. The set of record notes consists of physician
notes, physiotherapist notes and chief physician notes. These are usually very short
compared to discharge summaries. The amount of sensitive identifiers varies a lot and
depends on the profession, and were included due to their shortness and the mutual
variation as they are recorded by different health care professionals .
11.1.2 Annotation
The original files were copied into a separate folder in which the annotation was per-
formed. The annotation method was straight forward; a special tag <::sens::> was
placed subsequently after each sensitive word or sensitive textual sequence without
whitespace, as shown below:
Original text: ”Patient name: Hans Gunnar”
Annotated text: ”Patient name: Hans<::sens::> Gunnar<::sens::>”
We annotated sensitive information on a token-level. Hence, the example above contains
two sensitive instances, even though the these are a part of one sensitive identifier, i.e.
patient name. The annotation was performed by both of us, whereby each note was
annotated by one person, then quality assured by the another. It is common to quality
assure two - or three times as human annotation is prone to error[1].
11.1.3 Choices
It is often a challenge to recognize sensitive information. The main challenge is to de-
cide on what should be classified as so-called indirectly identifiable information. The
annotator has to assume the knowledge of a potential intruder, and foresee that this
knowledge together with the disclosed information not links to an individual, as ex-
plained in section 2.10.1. We chose to ignore indirectly identifying information in most
of the cases, except when the information revealed extreme incidents, for instance inci-
dents which could have been mentioned in the newspapers. For such cases, the other
person was consulted, before making a final decision.
11.2. MODIFIED DISCHARGE SUMMARIES 85
We didn’t follow any guideline, however we used the compiled list from Oslo Univer-
sity’s (described in 2.10.1) consisting of sensitive identifiers. However, as some textual
sequences were challenging to annotate, we made some simplifications along the way to
ensure consistent annotation. These are presented in the list below.
• Gender was not considered to be sensitive
• Number of children, and gender of children, is not sensitive with the exception of
cases where the patient has more than 6 children.
• Ward names are sensitive
• Week days are sensitive
11.2 Modified Discharge Summaries
In addition to the 225 notes, we created a special test set with the same discharge
summaries, but without the structured information. The files were produced by creating
a copy of the annotated discharge summaries, and removing the structured information
placed at the top and bottom of the document. We created this set in order to evaluate
the application’s performance on pure narrative text, which is the actual aim of the
application.
11.3 Properties
As described above, sensitive information was annotated on token-level. This means
that every sensitive identifier split by one or several whitespace characters were tagged.
The table below provides a simple overview of the total amount of sensitive and insen-
sitive tokens:
Type Sensitive Insensitive Total Sensitivty Percentage
Discharge summaries 2,152 16,786 18,938 ≈ 11.4%
Nursing notes 662 6,320 6,982 ≈ 9.5%
Record notes 506 3,032 3,538 ≈ 14.3%
Entire reference standard 3,320 26,138 29,458 ≈ 11.3%
Modified discharge summaries 668 14,933 15,601 ≈ 4.3%
Table 11.1: The amount of sensitive and insensitive tokens in the reference standard
11.4 Maximum Token IDF
The inverse document frequency was explained in section 8.2.1, and is expressed by this
fraction [71]:
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idft = log10
N
dft
Where:
N denotes the number of documents in the corpus.
dft denotes document frequency (amount of documents containing the term)
Our realistic EHR-corpus consists of 45614 clinical notes (N). The maximum IDF-score
a token can achieve is when it only occurs once in the corpus. Since every token at least
has one occurrence, the dft can be set to 1. Hence the maximum token IDF-score can
be calculated as follows:
idf = log10
45, 614
1
= 4, 66
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Results
The following chapter presents conducted experiments together with the achieved re-
sults.
12.1 Experimental Approach
Pursuant to research question 2 (1.2.2), one of the main objectives in this project is to
investigate the performance of different methods and techniques, and how different com-
binations of these affects the performance. The various experiments were conducted on
the manually annotated reference standard (described in the previous chapter), consist-
ing of discharge summaries, nursing notes and record notes. The experiment is divided
into three parts in which each part tests de-identification approaches based on different
method combinations:
Part 1: A de-identification approach based on regular expressions and statistical meth-
ods.
Part 2: A pure pattern matching approach, without statistical methods.
Part 3: A de-identification approach, combining all components.
The results are presented in terms of recall, precision, fallout and f-measure. These
fractions are normally used for de-identification purpose and are explained under section
4.4. Some results are presented in diagrams without the precise digits, however the
precise results have been added to the appendix B.
12.2 Regular Expressions and IDF
The first experiment is to measure the performance of a de-identification approach based
on regular expressions and IDF-scores. The aim is to observe how well a de-identification
application performs without dictionary lookups. High performance is not expected as
the application is tag-based, whereas the reference works can be considered as the
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supporting beam of our application. On the other hand, it is interesting to observe
how well the tokens and sentences are tagged on a statistical basis, by the support of
regular expressions. Regular expressions are included in order to recognize certain types
of directly identifying information, i.e. dates and national identification numbers.
As explained under section 8.2, the statistical component makes use of thresholds which
are compared against each token’s and sentence’ IDF-score. The textual sequences
that fails to be recognized by the regular expressions will be classified by the statistical
component, which most likely involves the majority the tokens and sentences.
As the majority of the textual sequences will be classified by the statistical component,
the binary classification is performed by looking at the token/sentence idf -score, in
which a score above the IDF-thresholds denotes sensitive information and vice versa.
The application is tested on three different test sets: Discharge summaries, nursing notes
and the entire reference standard. The token idf-threshold is varied (x-axis) in order to
observe how the four performance measures behave. We in only use two distinct values
for sentence idf -threshold. This decision is made upon the assumption that almost
every sentence is unique, hence sentence-level IDF-scores will in most cases be quite
similar in contrast to token-level IDF-scores, whereby the few repetitive sentences will
have lower scores and thus easy to catch.
12.2.1 Results
The following graphs illustrate the performance of a de-identification application based
on regular expressions and statistical methods.
Figure 12.1: De-identification results on the entire reference standard using IDF and
regular expressions, with sentence-idf = 2
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Figure 12.2: De-identification results on entire reference standard using IDF and regular
expressions, with sentence-idf = 4
Figure 12.3: De-identification results on discharge summaries using IDF and regular
expressions, with sentence-idf = 2
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Figure 12.4: De-identification results on discharge summaries using IDF and regular
expressions, with sentence-idf = 4
Figure 12.5: De-identification results on nursing notes using IDF and regular expres-
sions, with sentence-idf = 2
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Figure 12.6: De-identification results on nursing notes using IDF and regular expres-
sions, with sentence-idf = 4
The graphs above indicates weak performance when the sentence IDF-threshold is
locked to 4. Changing the sentence IDF-threshold from 2 to 4 affects the recall
significantly, the precision, however, remains unchanged. By increasing the sentence
IDF-threshold, the criteria for considering sentences as sensitive is implicitly increased,
which in turn has an evident impact on the recall as a lot of sensitive information “slips
through” as insensitive. Although the recall has a clear leap, the overall binary clas-
sification isn’t affected to any significant extent in any of the test sets, which can be
argued by looking at the precision and f-measure. Hence, more sensitive information is
recognized, while the amount of miss-classifications also increases. All the diagrams in-
dicate that the overall performance (considered f-measure) increases when the sentence
IDF-threshold is increased.
The overall tendency is that an increase in the token IDF-threshold weeds out a certain
amount of miss-classifications, which is denoted by a decreasing fallout-graph, however
it also causes a significant decrease in the recall-graph. Put differently, high thresholds
for classifying tokens as sensitive, decreases the recall, hence a lower amount of relevant
information is recognized which in turn indicates an negative correlation between the
token IDF-thresholds and recall graphs.
12.3 Pattern Matching
The next experiment measure the performance of a pure pattern matching approach.
The statistical component is disabled, and the application totally relies on reference
works and regular expressions.
The phrase search (7.3.1) is the only adjustable method. The Levenshtein-distance
value was varied in the range [0,3], in which a distance of 0 implies exact match. A
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theoretical explanation of the Levenshtein-distance (or edit-distance) is provided in
section 7.3.1. Additionally, this de-identification approach has been tested disregarding
the word order which means that the words within a phrase has to overlap with a
description in the reference works, without any spelling difference, in order to match.
LD = Levenshtein Distance
Phrase Search Setup Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
LD = 1 0,88 0,39 0,18 0,54
LD = 2 0,89 0,39 0,18 0,54
LD = 3 0,89 0,39 0,18 0,54
Unordered Words 0,88 0,39 0,18 0,54
Exact Match 0,88 0,38 0,18 0,53
Table 12.1: The pattern matching results on all note types
Phrase Search Setup Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
LD = 1 0,87 0,38 0,18 0,53
LD = 2 0,88 0,38 0,18 0,53
LD = 3 0,88 0,38 0,18 0,53
Unordered Words 0,87 0,38 0,18 0,53
Exact Match 0,87 0,38 0,18 0,53
Table 12.2: The pattern matching results on discharge summaries
Phrase Search Setup Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
LD = 1 0,85 0,32 0,19 0,47
LD = 2 0,86 0,32 0,19 0,46
LD = 3 0,87 0,32 0,19 0,47
Unordered Words 0,83 0,31 0,19 0,46
Exact Match 0,83 0,31 0,19 0,46
Table 12.3: The pattern matching results on nursing notes
Phrase Search Setup Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
LD = 1 0,98 0,55 0,13 0,70
LD = 2 0,98 0,54 0,14 0,70
LD = 3 0,98 0,54 0,14 0,69
Unordered Words 0,97 0,55 0,13 0,70
Exact Match 0,97 0,54 0,14 0,70
Table 12.4: The pattern matching results on record notes
It can be observed from these results that the mutual differences are quite small
within each test set and that the overall performance is minimally influenced by the
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Levenshtein-distance variations. This might be explained by the cosine similarity which
is used in the phrase search; potentially matching phrases are filtered out by cosine sim-
ilarity (explained in section 7.3.1), before investigating these with various Levenshtein-
distances. Hence, the potential phrases filtered out by cosine similarity might be un-
varied and monotonous, causing minimal impact on further analysis.
The results produced with a Levenshtein-distance value of 3 are slightly better than
other results in terms of recall. In spite of minimal differences we chose to lock the
Levenshtein-distance to 3 as an “optimized” (among the 4 results) value for further
testing.
The overall performance achieved in the record notes increases impressively, compared
to the first experiment. With a nearly top hitting recall and much better precision, this
represents our best obtained results till now. The performance-increase on the record
notes is also the main contribution for raising the overall performance on the entire
corpus. Record notes are short and concise and rarely involves sensitive information
other than names, dates and national identification numbers. These identifiers are easily
recognized by regular expressions and the name-dictionary.
12.4 Pattern Matching and IDF
The last part of the experiment is to test a de-identification approach which is based
on a combination of all the implemented methods and techniques during the project.
Hence, the de-identification application includes regular expressions, statistical methods
and reference works.
In the first part of the experiment, we used one IDF-threshold for tokens and one
for sentences, in which we simply compared the idf-scores to the thresholds and made
classifications accordingly. However, this part of the experiment does not fully depend
on the idf-scores and has the advantage of utilizing reference works. We will use upper-
and lower thresholds for tokens. When a token’s idf-score exceeds the upper token idf-
threshold it is classified as sensitive, and vice versa. In contrast to the first experiment,
reference works and regular expressions will handle the tokens with idf -scores falling in
between the upper and lower IDF-threshold. Tags from the reference works are assigned
higher priority during the classification.
We will stick to only one sentence idf-threshold as most sentences are unique, hence the
minority of similar sentences can most likely be separated by their significantly different
IDF-score.
In order to maximize the performance for this approach, a “best-effort” setup was found
by testing different values for the each variable, before proceeding with the tests. This
involved the tuning of the upper token idf-threshold (I:U), sentence idf-threshold (I:S)
and the sensitive sentence proportion (SSP). The lower token idf-threshold was the only
variable during the third experiment.
The tuning was performed on the entire reference standard. The following table(12.5)
only shows a selection of the obtained results by different setups:
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I:L I:U I:S P SPP Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
1,50 4,00 3,00 LD = 3 0,80 0,75 0,44 0,12 0,55
1,50 4,00 2,00 LD = 3 0,80 0,78 0,43 0,13 0,56
1,50 4,00 1,70 LD = 3 0,80 0,83 0,43 0,14 0,57
1,50 5,00 1,70 LD = 3 0,80 0,83 0,44 0,14 0,57
1,50 5,00 1,70 LD = 3 0,60 0,84 0,41 0,16 0,55
1,50 5,00 1,70 LD = 3 1,00 0,83 0,44 0,14 0,58
1,50 5,00 1,60 LD = 3 1,00 0,85 0,43 0,14 0,57
Table 12.5: Tuning
Firstly, the sentence IDF-threshold was tuned. The values 3, 2, 1.7 and 1.6 were tried,
where 1.7 gave the highest F-measure. The difference between 1.6 and 1.7 were minimal
and chose 1.7 as the a suitable threshold.
Secondly, different values for SPP were tried, i.e.: 0.6, 0.8, 1.0. The results showed that
1.0 proved to be slightly better than the two others. However, the threshold value 1.0
theoretically denotes that every token within the sentence has to be sensitive in order
to classify the fully sentence as sensitive. This is an extremely rare case, which is the
actual reason for achieving better results. In other words, the application performs best
without the SPP feature.
Thirdly, the upper token IDF-threshold was varied between the values 4.0 and 5.0.
Since a token idf-score has a maximum value of 4.66 (see (11.4)), a token idf-score of
5.0 is unattainable which implicitly means that the feature is turned off. The difference
was slight, but 5.0 gave better precision. This is expected since the upper token IDF-
threshold is examined at a very late stage of the classification, having little or no impact
on the overall performance.
The tuning resulted in a setup with the following values:
Token idf-threshold: 5.0 (Turned off)
Sensitive proportion: 1,0 (Turned off)
Sentence idf-threshold: 1.7
Phrase Search Setup: Levenshtein Distance 3
Further, the experiment was performed on each document type separately, and the
entire reference standard. The lower token idf -threshold was varied in order to observe
how the performance is affected when increasing the threshold.
The following results were achieved:
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Figure 12.7: Results on all notes
Figure 12.8: Results on discharge summaries
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Figure 12.9: Results on nursing notes
Figure 12.10: Results on record notes
The overall performance within each test set is well reflected in the first diagram 12.7
which presents the performance on the entire reference standard. The same atendency
is repeated for each of the 4 graphs; recall and fallout decreases proportionally with in-
creased token IDF -threshold, whereas the f-measure and precision have a corresponding
increase.
A noteworthy fact is that the f-measure graph is squeezed by the recall and precision
graphs, whereby this equation is true for every result: precision(idf) ≤ f-measure(idf)
≤ recall(idf), idf [1, 5], which on a side note reminds about the sandwich theorem.
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All the diagrams illustrates that the recall and fallout graphs starts at the top and
decreases almost in parallel when the token IDF -threshold is increased, whereas the
precision increases, which is the tendency for all results. Further, the f-measure graphs
indicates that an increase in the token idf-threshold increases the overall performance;
Less sensitive information is recognized (recall) but the classifications proves to be more
precise.
Unrecognized textual sequences (without tags) are classified as sensitive. Disclosure of
unknown textual sequences can be risky and thus have to be removed. However, this
principle is turned contrary when the lower token IDF-threshold is locked to 5.0; the
biggest idf-score a token can achieve is 4.66 this also implies that all information is
regarded as insensitive on token-level. When every token is regarded as insensitive on
token-level, the classification totally depends on sentence idf, dictionary lookups and
regular expressions. If none of these components recognize the token, it is tagged as
insensitive. The application performs best with maximum lower-token idf -threshold,
in which our assumption is turned around and regards every token as insensitive. The
number of false positives decreases, which results in falling fallout and increasing preci-
sion. Hence, the overall performance improves significantly when assuming that every
textual sequence is insensitive, rather than sensitive; which is logical as the insensitive
information constitutes the majority of clinical documents.
12.5 Modified Discharge summaries
The actual intention with this project is to develop an application with the purpose
of de-identifying free text clinical documents. The clinical documents in our reference
standard contain a lot of structured information; in fact the majority of the sensitive
identifiers occur in the document headers. Hence, as a supplementary experiment,
we also tested our best approach on pure narrative documents. As mentioned earlier
11.1.2, we modified the discharge summaries in the reference standard by removing the
structured information at the top and bottom. The same setup were used as in the
previous experiment 12.4.
Following results were achieved:
Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
0.62 0.42 0.04 0.50
Table 12.6: Result on modified discharge summaries
The results indicates that the application performs significantly poorer on pure narrative
text, by comparing these results with the results obtained in the third experiment 12.8.
Even though the fallout has minimal differences, the overall performance in terms of
f-measure has diminished from 0.75 to 0.5, due to significant decrease in both recall and
precision.
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13
Discussion
13.1 Sources of Errors
The obtained results are influenced and weakened by several sources of errors. This
section describes the most important ones.
13.1.1 Evaluation Method
The evaluation method used in the experiment has some weaknesses. Firstly, the evalu-
ation disregards the loss of quality. Recognized information is only regarded as sensitive
or insensitive and removed/retained accordingly, however the usability of the outcome
is disregarded. The purpose of de-identification is to remove sensitive text in order to
use the medical contents within legislative boundaries, however the performance mea-
sures don’t consider the usefulness of the de-identified documents since each token is
“equally weighted”; the performance is equally affected whether an ICD10 -code[53] or
a connective (conjunction) is removed, in which the former is code is much more crucial
to retain. Hence, the overall binary classification performance measured by recall, preci-
sion, fallout and f-measure, does not necessarily denote the quality the de-identification.
Miss-classification of sensitive information units that are separated by several tokens,
has more impact on the performance than they actually should. Take for example the
phone number “74 12 93 10”; this phone number is split by four tokens, and if it isn’t
recognized it will be regarded as four missed identifiers rather than one. This is a
drawback and creates a misleading picture of the performance.
Yet another weakness is related to the f-measure. The f-measure (f1-score) used in the
experiment has equal weighting between recall and precision. As recall actually has
higher priority than precision in a de-identification application, this should be regarded
in the f-measure formula. The reason we chose to use this f-measure formula was to
make our results comparable to the results presented in the state of the art chapter (4).
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13.1.2 Reference Standard
Since we only annotated the most obvious indirectly identifying information, the refer-
ence standard might not be completely de-identified. For instance classifying gender as
insensitive is a rather questionable choice. As previously mentioned, it is very difficult
to ensure that the records are completely de-identified, since it is hard to determine
what information a potential intruder holds (discussed in 2.10.2).
We made several simplifications during the annotation process which causes the results
to be imprecise. An affective simplification is classifying ward name as sensitive; ward
names are repetitive and a part of all headings. When these are unrecognized and
regarded as sensitive the performance is noticeably affected. This is a partial reason
for why the nursing notes and discharge summaries received significantly worse results
than the record notes during the pattern matching, since almost every ward name was
recognized in the latter type.
Manual annotation conducted by two students is an obvious drawback. The annota-
tion should have been quality assured by an independent third party. Moreover, it
is important to emphasize that the application also might be vulnerable to document
variations since our reference standard is small, which also makes our obtained results
highly unreliable.
13.1.3 Classification
Random classifications may produce variable results. However, our results indicates
contrary behavior, having minimal impact by random classifications. For instance, the
results produced by the pure pattern matching approach in part 2 (12.3), different
Levenshtein-distances do not affect the results to any significant extent, which also
supports the assertion that the random classification has minimal impact on the results.
The classification algorithms are too simplistic (as discussed in chapter 9). Multiple
tags cause ambiguities, especially when the sensitivity labels are different, and resolving
these in a robust manner requires an enriched rule base[40]. Too many tokens are looked
up and matched in various sensitive dictionaries and tagged as sensitive, whereas the
actual word is insensitive. Besides, the attempt of resolving ambiguities through POS-
tags suffers the weakness of imprecise POS-tagging.
13.2 Performance
13.2.1 Statistical vs Pure Pattern Matching
The only difference between the first and second part is that the first used a statis-
tical component (IDF), whereas the second used reference works. By swapping the
statistical component with reference works, the overall performance was improved, in
which the f-measure increased from 0.4 to 0.54. The primary reason for this increase
is the recall boost in the second approach. The recall value increased from 0.7 to 0.89,
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which indicates that the use of reference works recognizes more sensitive information.
The statistical component failed to recognize repetitive sensitive information due to low
idf-scores, whereas the pattern matching approach effectively looks up every token and
recognizes almost every sensitive identifier, and has significantly better precision (0.29
vs 0.39). All in all, the statistical approach failed to recognize as much sensitive informa-
tion as the pattern matching approach, which may indicate that de-identification based
on pure token- and sentence-level idf -scores are insufficient, and needs supplementary
statistical methods.
13.2.2 All Methods
There are clear differences between the results achieved throughout the three partial
experiments. The last experiment, in which every component was included, achieved
best the result with a f-measure of 0.75, distinct from 0.40 (part 1 ) and 0.54 (part 2 ).
This was somewhat expected as most of the textual units (tokens and sentences) are
investigated by several components, thus better grounds for decision-making.
By tuning various variables (token IDF-thresholds, sentence idf-threshold, Levenshtein
Distance etc.) the performance of each component was maximized, and produced sig-
nificantly better results. Even though the recall was better in the second part and
decreased from 0.89 to 0.77, the precision boosted from 0.39 to 0.68, resulting in a solid
increase in f-measure. The main strategy was to prioritize the tags assigned by regular
expressions and references works, and further employ the thresholds provided by the
statistical component.
Tokens without any tags are impossible to classify, thus classified as sensitive to be
on the “safe” side. However, this choice significantly reduces the overall performance.
Results from part 3 (12.4) emphasizes this impact when the lower IDF-threshold for
tokens are increased. Every token is regarded as insensitive due to maximum lower
IDF-threshold and produces the best results. The overall performance is increased
while the recall is slightly decreased. This can be explained by the fact that the largest
proportion of tokens in a note is insensitive, hence, most likely that an unknown token
is insensitive.
13.2.3 Note Types
The de-identification performance on the nursing notes is quite poor compared to dis-
charge summaries and record notes. One way to explain this is that nursing notes
often contains inconsistent, error-prone, informal and oral language. Neamatullah et.
al [1] states that clinical staffs frequently use technical terminology, non-standard ab-
breviations, ungrammatical statements, misspellings, and incorrect punctuation and
capitalization in nursing progress notes. They also states that nursing notes appear to
be significantly more challenging to de-identify than other forms of medical notes, such
as discharge summaries. This statement is in accordance with our results, in which
the discharge summaries obtained more satisfactory de-identification than the nursing
notes.
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13.3 Structured vs Unstructured
By comparing the results from the discharge summaries with the results from the mod-
ified discharge summaries, it is evident that the application performs better on dis-
charge summaries with retained structured information. The structured information in
the discharge summaries is easier recognized by regular expression, especially dates and
national identification numbers, which proves the robustness of the regular expressions.
The fallout value is close to equal in both types of discharge summaries, which indicates
most of the miss-classification occurs in the free text part since most of the structured
information is sensitive. This proves a solid de-identification performance in the pure
structured part of the documents.
14
Conclusion
14.1 Conclusion
14.1.1 Question 1
With the obtained results, we are able to answer some of the questions presented in
the introduction 1.2.2. The first question: How well, in terms of recall, precision,
fallout and f-measure, can we implement a de-identification application in the course of
a semester, on the basis of rule-based and simple statistical methods?
We have managed to develop a simple de-identification application, with following per-
formance measures:
Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
0.77 0.68 0.05 0.72
Table 14.1: Best results
It is important to emphasize that the results must be considered with regard to the fact
that there has been made a number of simplifications.
14.1.2 Question 2
The second research question: How will different combinations of the implemented al-
gorithms and techniques affect the performance?
This is mainly reflected through the results achieved in each part of the experiment.
As a summary, the results shows that a combination of regular expressions, reference
works (sentence-level and word-level search) and statistical methods achieves better
overall de-identification performance, considered f-measure, in contrast to component-
wise performance.
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Using idf-scores independently proves to be insufficient, and might need the support
of more sophisticated statistical methods. However, the performance significantly in-
creased when the idf-component classified every unknown textual sequence as insen-
sitive. This indicates that the idf-component does not contribute to recognize any
sensitive information in our ”best-effort” approach, but only provides the advantage of
accepting unknown textual sequences as insensitive.
Extending the de-identification application with additional methods gives better grounds
for classification, at least in tag based approaches, but at the same time requires robust
algorithms to resolve ambiguities and make final classifications.
The idf-component does not provide better precision without aggravating the recall,
whereas reference works and regular expressions provides robust performance, and con-
tributes to recognize most of the sensitive identifiers.
14.1.3 Question 3
The third research question reads as follows:
Can such system be realized in the Norwegian health care system, and replace/simplify
manual annotation/de-identification?
There is no doubt that a semi-automatic de-identification application can be realized
and used by the Norwegian health sector. The ground for this assertion is that two
students have managed to implement an application that roughly recognizes 77 percent
of the sensitive information in a corpus of 225 clinical documents. By the course of a
semester (5 months), a de-identification application has been developed from scratch
by the means of simple pattern matching and statistical methods.
There is need for manual adjustments to the de-identified output since we have disre-
garded some types of sensitive information, however, such adjustments can be quickly
fixed; when a big corpus of clinical notes are de-identified by this application, manual
adjustments can be performed much faster in contrast to manually de-identify the en-
tire corpus. Even though our application only recognizes a limited range of sensitive
identifiers, it is highly modifiable and can be extended by more reference works, regular
expressions and even entire components can be added to the pipeline, for instance a
machine learning component.
A fully automatic de-identification application, on the other hand, is obviously most
practical. However, even though an application achieves perfect f-measure pursuant to
a gold standard, it may have certain limitations when applied on new documents. After
working on real Norwegian EHR-notes, our experience suggests that quality assurance
of the de-identified output always will be needed, irrespective of the recall, precision,
fallout and f-measure values. Certain clinical documents reveal a lot of sensitive in-
formation (indirectly) which cannot be recognized unless a computer obtains cognitive
skills, and interprets human language. Besides, even if the documents can be inter-
preted, it can still be hard to decide whether or not a textual sequence constitutes
indirectly identifying information. Since patient data is comprised by strict and rigid
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legislation, manual quality assurance and adjustments seem to be needed, at least on
simplified applications as the one we have developed.
Pursuant to the initial question, automatic de-identification applications are fully re-
alizable, but we don not believe that these can replace manual de-identification. We
also believe that a robust semi-automatic de-identification application can simplify the
de-identification process, and prove to be significantly time- and cost effective within
the health sector.
14.2 Further Work
The de-identification application adapted to Norwegian free text notes, developed through
this project, can be considered as a preliminary study for future attempts. Since no
previous studies deals with de-identification of Norwegian clinical notes, we do not have
any directly related work to build our application upon; hence our study only focuses
on experimenting with different techniques used for other languages. There are several
elements that can contribute to enhance this application.
14.2.1 Rule Base
First of all, the rule base needs a considerable enrichment in order to improve the
classifications and to resolve ambiguities. Enriched and adapted rules can contribute
greatly to increase the performance, which has been shown be Gupta et. al [40]. Our
pattern matching employs a minimalistic rule base and an even poorer classification
algorithm. The application has to be extended by more reference works, linguistic
rules, medical classification systems and a robust classifier.
14.2.2 Machine Learning
Machine learning methods could have been a part of this experimental approach. As we
have described in the state of the art chapter 4, supervised machine learning methods
have proved to be very effective for de-identification purpose. A large corpus of anno-
tated text is required to train the machine learning algorithms, which does not exist
in Norwegian. This is a huge drawback as several machine learning algorithms can be
employed off the shelf, and could serve as a cheap classification feature in our approach.
An annotated corpus should be prepared in order to provide new and valuable oppor-
tunities for NLP-researchers. However, it is important to emphasize that this requires
significant work by domain experts.
14.2.3 Preprocessor
The file-cleaning process was not intended as a part of the preprocessor, but we early
realized the need of this component during the first preprocessor runs on the realistic
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clinical notes. Unfortunately, the files are not satisfactory cleaned as there are still un-
handled character-types causing somewhat incorrect splitting. Apache Lucene provides
word-splitters which could have been a better alternative; in fact the entire Document-
class offered by Lucene[50] could have been used, as it offers a lot of tools which could
prove beneficial at later stages of the system. Hence, a replacement of the document
class could prove beneficial.
14.2.4 POS-tagger
The POS-tagger does not perform nearly as good as expected. The tagger was trained on
a newspaper corpus. There can be several reasons for this behavior whereby one can be
explained by domain-difference. Clinical texts contains sentences that are grammatical
incomplete in contrast to newspaper-sentences, in addition to a significantly different
vocabulary. An experiment performed on this POS-tagger by Brox et al.[51] indicated
that relevant training data from the clinical domain gives better results for the tagging
task in this domain than training the tagger on a corpus from a more general domain.
A better alternative might have been the Oslo-Bergen tagger which is a pure rule based
tagger and has been continuously improved since the late 90’s.
14.2.5 Compound words
The lack of a tool recognizing Norwegian compound words is another drawback. Com-
pounds are extremely productive in Norwegian; 10.4% of all words in running text
are compound, and any text sample will contain a great number of compounds, which
is true for even small samples[73]. The total amount of combinations is huge, hence
next to impossible to gather these inside a dictionary. Compounds revealing sensitive
information may be challenging to recognize. Here are a few examples:
Indiskfødt (Indian-born)
Drammensgutt (A boy from the town Drammen)
Mattelærer (Maths teacher)
Knespesialist (Knee specialist)
These are examples of sensitive words that will not be recognized by any of our com-
ponents.
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A
Regulation
A.1 Regulation on health records, §8
Health records shall include following information to the extent they are relevant and
necessary:
• a) Tilstrekkelige opplysninger til a˚ kunne identifisere og kontakte pasienten, blant
annet pasientens navn, adresse, bostedskommune, fødselsnummer, telefonnum-
mer, sivilstand og yrke.
• b) Opplysninger om hvem som er pasientens nærmeste p˚arørende, jf. pasien-
trettighetsloven § 1-3 bokstav b og lov om psykisk helsevern § 1-3, og hvordan
vedkommende om nødvendig kan kontaktes.
• c) Dersom pasienten ikke har samtykkekompetanse, skal det nedtegnes hvem som
samtykker p˚a vegne av pasienten, jf. pasientrettighetsloven kapittel 4.
• d) N˚ar og hvordan helsehjelp er gitt, for eksempel i forbindelse med ordinær
konsultasjon, telefonkontakt, sykebesøk eller opphold i helseinstitusjon. Dato for
innleggelse og utskriving.
• e) Bakgrunnen for helsehjelpen, opplysninger om pasientens sykehistorie, og op-
plysninger om p˚ag˚aende behandling. Beskrivelse av pasientens tilstand, herunder
status ved innleggelse og utskriving.
• f) Foreløpig diagnose, observasjoner, funn, undersøkelser, diagnose, behandling,
pleie og annen oppfølgning som settes i verk og resultatet av dette. Plan eller
avtale om videre oppfølgning.
• g) Opplysninger som nevnt i § 6 fjerde ledd.
• h) Overveielser som har ledet til tiltak som fraviker fra gjeldende retningslinjer.
• i) Om det er gitt r˚ad og informasjon til pasient og p˚arørende, og hovedinnholdet
i dette, jf. pasientrettighetsloven § 3-2. Pasientens eventuelle reservasjon mot a˚
motta informasjon.
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• j) Om pasienten har samtykket til eller motsatt seg nærmere angitt helsehjelp.
Pasientens alvorlige overbevisning eller vegring mot helsehjelp, jf. pasientret-
tighetsloven § 4-9. Pasientens samtykke eller reservasjon vedrørende informasjons-
behandling. Pasientens øvrige reservasjoner, krav eller forutsetninger.
• k) Om det er gjort gjeldende rettigheter som innsyn i journal og krav om ret-
ting og sletting, utfallet av dette, ved avslag at pasienten er gjort kjent med
klageadgangen, og eventuell klage i slik sak.
• l) Utveksling av informasjon med annet helsepersonell, for eksempel henvisninger,
epikriser, innleggelsesbegjæringer, resultater fra rekvirerte undersøkelser, attestkopier
m.m.
• m) Pasientens faste lege. Det helsepersonell som har begjært innleggelse eller har
henvist pasienten.
• n) Individuell plan etter spesialisthelsetjenesteloven § 2-5, psykisk helsevernloven
§ 4-1 eller kommunehelsetjenesteloven § 6-2a.
• o) Sykmeldinger og attester.
• p) Uttalelser om pasienten, for eksempel sakkyndige uttalelser.
• q) Om det er gitt opplysninger til politi, barneverntjenesten, helse- og omsorgst-
jenesten, sosialtjenesten mv., og om samtykke er innhentet fra pasienten eller den
som har kompetanse til a˚ avgi samtykke i saken. Det skal angis hvilke opplysninger
som er gitt.
• r) Tvangsinnleggelser, annen bruk av tvang, det faktiske og rettslige grunnlaget for
slik tvang og eventuelle kontrollkommisjonsvedtak, jf. lov om psykisk helsevern.
• s) En faglig begrunnelse1 i de tilfellene legen har reservert seg mot apotekets
generiske bytterett.2
• t) Opplysninger om hvorvidt pasient med psykisk sykdom, rusmiddelavhengighet
eller alvorlig somatisk sykdom eller skade har mindre˚arige barn.
• u) Opplysninger om foreldrene som har konsekvens for barnets behandlingssitu-
asjon, herunder nødvendige opplysninger om foreldrenes helsetilstand.
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Results
B.1 Regular Expressions and IDF
Token IDF Sentence IDF Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
0.50 2.00 0.85 0.14 0.65 0.25
1.00 2.00 0.84 0.15 0.59 0.26
1.50 2.00 0.83 0.19 0.46 0.30
2.00 2.00 0.78 0.24 0.31 0.37
2.50 2.00 0.68 0.28 0.22 0.40
0.50 4.00 0.66 0.14 0.54 0.22
1.00 4.00 0.66 0.15 0.49 0.24
1.50 4.00 0.66 0.18 0.39 0.28
2.00 4.00 0.62 0.23 0.23 0.33
2.50 4.00 0.55 0.27 0.19 0.36
Table B.1: The statistical component’s results on the entire reference standard
Token IDF Sentence IDF Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
0.50 2.00 0.95 0.15 0.70 0.26
1.00 2.00 0.94 0.16 0.65 0.27
1.50 2.00 0.92 0.18 0.53 0.31
2.00 2.00 0.87 0.23 0.37 0.37
2.50 2.00 0.77 0.27 0.27 0.40
0.50 4.00 0.74 0.14 0.58 0.24
1.00 4.00 0.74 0.15 0.54 0.25
1.50 4.00 0.73 0.18 0.44 0.28
2.00 4.00 0.70 0.22 0.31 0.34
2.50 4.00 0.63 0.26 0.24 0.36
Table B.2: The statistical component’s results on discharge summaries
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Token IDF Sentence IDF Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
0.50 2.00 0.63 0.12 0.48 0.21
1.00 2.00 0.63 0.14 0.40 0.23
1.50 2.00 0.61 0.19 0.28 0.29
2.00 2.00 0.56 0.26 0.16 0.36
2.50 2.00 0.45 0.33 0.10 0.38
0.50 4.00 0.43 0.11 0.37 0.17
1.00 4.00 0.43 0.13 0.31 0.20
1.50 4.00 0.43 0.17 0.22 0.25
2.00 4.00 0.40 0.24 0.13 0.30
2.50 4.00 0.31 0.28 0.09 0.29
Table B.3: The statistical component’s results on nursing notes
Token IDF Sentence IDF Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
0.50 2.00 0.71 0.15 0.68 0.25
1.00 2.00 0.71 0.16 0.63 0.26
1.50 2.00 0.70 0.20 0.47 0.31
2.00 2.00 0.67 0.26 0.33 0.37
2.50 2.00 0.60 0.33 0.20 0.43
0.50 3.00 0.70 0.15 0.67 0.25
1.00 3.00 0.70 0.16 0.62 0.26
1.50 3.00 0.70 0.20 0.47 0.31
2.00 3.00 0.67 0.26 0.33 0.37
2.50 3.00 0.60 0.33 0.20 0.43
0.50 4.00 0.63 0.14 0.64 0.23
1.00 4.00 0.63 0.15 0.59 0.24
1.50 4.00 0.63 0.19 0.45 0.29
2.00 4.00 0.60 0.24 0.31 0.35
2.50 4.00 0.54 0.32 0.19 0.40
Table B.4: The statistical component’s results on record notes
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B.2 Pattern Matching and IDF
I:L I:U I:S P SP Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
1.00 4.00 0.80 Exact 0.80 0.87 0.41 0.16 0.55
1.00 4.00 3.00 LD3 0.80 0.75 0.41 0.14 0.53
1.50 4.00 3.00 LD3 0.80 0.75 0.44 0.12 0.55
1.50 4.00 2.00 LD3 0.80 0.78 0.43 0.13 0.56
1.50 4.00 1.70 LD3 0.80 0.83 0.43 0.14 0.57
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 0.80 0.83 0.44 0.14 0.57
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 0.60 0.84 0.41 0.16 0.55
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.83 0.44 0.14 0.58
1.50 5.00 1.60 LD3 1.00 0.85 0.43 0.14 0.57
1.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.84 0.41 0.15 0.55
1.70 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.83 0.45 0.13 0.58
2.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.83 0.49 0.11 0.62
2.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.82 0.52 0.10 0.64
3.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.81 0.55 0.08 0.66
5.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.77 0.68 0.05 0.72
4.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.79 0.61 0.06 0.69
3.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.81 0.58 0.08 0.67
4.40 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.78 0.65 0.05 0.71
Table B.5: Results on all notes
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I:L I:U I:S P SP Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
1.00 4.00 0.80 Exact 0.80 0.87 0.38 0.18 0.53
1.00 4.00 3.00 LD3 0.80 0.83 0.41 0.15 0.55
1.50 4.00 3.00 LD3 0.80 0.83 0.44 0.13 0.58
1.50 4.00 2.00 LD3 0.80 0.86 0.44 0.14 0.58
1.50 4.00 1.70 LD3 0.80 0.86 0.42 0.15 0.56
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 0.80 0.86 0.42 0.15 0.57
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 0.60 0.87 0.40 0.17 0.55
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.86 0.43 0.15 0.57
1.50 5.00 1.60 LD3 1.00 0.86 0.41 0.16 0.56
1.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.87 0.40 0.17 0.55
1.70 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.85 0.43 0.14 0.57
2.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.85 0.49 0.11 0.62
2.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.84 0.51 0.10 0.64
3.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.84 0.54 0.09 0.66
5.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.78 0.68 0.05 0.72
4.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.81 0.60 0.07 0.69
3.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.83 0.56 0.08 0.67
4.40 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.78 0.65 0.05 0.71
Table B.6: Results on discharge summaries
I:L I:U I:S P SP Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
1.00 4.00 0.80 Exact 0.80 0.83 0.42 0.12 0.56
1.00 4.00 3.00 LD3 0.80 0.52 0.36 0.10 0.42
1.50 4.00 3.00 LD3 0.80 0.52 0.39 0.09 0.44
1.50 4.00 2.00 LD3 0.80 0.60 0.38 0.10 0.46
1.50 4.00 1.70 LD3 0.80 0.67 0.40 0.11 0.50
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 0.80 0.67 0.40 0.10 0.50
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 0.60 0.67 0.37 0.12 0.48
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.67 0.41 0.10 0.51
1.50 5.00 1.60 LD3 1.00 0.72 0.42 0.10 0.53
1.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.67 0.37 0.12 0.48
1.70 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.67 0.42 0.10 0.52
2.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.66 0.44 0.09 0.53
2.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.65 0.48 0.07 0.55
3.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.64 0.52 0.06 0.57
5.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.63 0.60 0.04 0.61
4.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.63 0.56 0.05 0.60
3.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.63 0.54 0.06 0.58
4.40 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.63 0.58 0.05 0.60
Table B.7: Results on nursing notes
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I:L I:U I:S P SP Recall Precision Fallout F-measure
1.00 4.00 0.80 Exact 0.80 0.97 0.54 0.14 0.70
1.00 4.00 3.00 LD3 0.80 0.69 0.45 0.14 0.54
1.50 4.00 3.00 LD3 0.80 0.69 0.46 0.14 0.55
1.50 4.00 2.00 LD3 0.80 0.71 0.46 0.14 0.56
1.50 4.00 1.70 LD3 0.80 0.96 0.53 0.14 0.68
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 0.80 0.96 0.53 0.14 0.69
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 0.60 0.96 0.47 0.18 0.63
1.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.96 0.54 0.14 0.69
1.50 5.00 1.60 LD3 1.00 0.97 0.54 0.14 0.70
1.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.96 0.53 0.14 0.68
1.70 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.96 0.56 0.13 0.70
2.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.95 0.57 0.12 0.72
2.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.94 0.61 0.10 0.74
3.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.94 0.66 0.08 0.77
5.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.92 0.79 0.04 0.85
4.00 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.93 0.72 0.06 0.81
3.50 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.93 0.69 0.07 0.79
4.40 5.00 1.70 LD3 1.00 0.92 0.75 0.05 0.83
Table B.8: Results on record notes
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C
Unicode Whitespace Table
Code Name of the Character
U+0020 SPACE
U+00A0 NO-BREAK SPACE
U+1680 OGHAM SPACE MARK
U+180E MONGOLIAN VOWEL SEPARATOR
U+2000 EN QUAD
U+2001 EM QUAD
U+2002 EN SPACE
U+2003 EM SPACE
U+2004 THREE-PER-EM SPACE
U+2005 FOUR-PER-EM SPACE
U+2006 SIX-PER-EM SPACE
U+2007 FIGURE SPACE
U+2008 PUNCTUATION SPACE
U+2009 THIN SPACE
U+200A HAIR SPACE
U+200B ZERO WIDTH SPACE
U+202F NARROW NO-BREAK SPACE
U+205F MEDIUM MATHEMATICAL SPACE
U+3000 IDEOGRAPHIC SPACE
U+FEFF ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE
Table C.1: Unicode space characters
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D
Input-Output Example
Figure D.1: The output produced by our de-identification application on the fictitious
clinical note presented in the introduction 1.1
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